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Choice may be determined both by a consideration of one￿ s welfare (normative
preference) and by desires (temptation preference). To provide foundations for such
a theory, Gul and Pesendorfer [10, 11] adopt a preference over choice problems as a
primitive and hypothesize that temptation creates a preference for commitment. This
paper argues that temptation may in fact create the absence of a preference for com-
mitment, and that the primitive may not be empirically meaningful since it requires
us to observe behavior in the absence of temptation. An alternative approach to
providing foundations is introduced. Motivated by the evidence on preference rever-
sals, it is hypothesized that delayed temptations are easier to resist than immediate
temptations. Normative preference is derived via choices between su¢ ciently delayed
alternatives, and temptation preference is inferred from discrepancies between nor-
mative preference and choice. With a choice correspondence as the primitive, agents
who are ￿ tempted not to commit￿are modeled. The foundations of the model are
used to identify evidence supporting such temptation.
Keywords: Self-Control, Temptation, Commitment, Preference Reversals, Re-
vealed Preference.
JEL classi￿cation number: D11, D60.
21. Introduction
An agent may be breaking his diet, taking drugs, making an expensive purchase, etc.
while telling himself that he really should not. Such instances suggest that choice is
determined not by one, but two preference orderings: a temptation preference that
captures the agent￿ s desires, and a normative preference that captures his view of what
choices he should make, his view of what is best for his welfare. Choice behavior is the
outcome of an aggregation of temptation preference and normative preference. The
agent is said to experience temptation when his desires con￿ ict with his judgment
regarding the best course of action, that is, when his temptation preference con￿ icts
with his normative preference. He is said to have self-control problems when he
cannot always resist the desires he judges to be ￿ bad￿ , that is, when his choices do
not necessarily respect his normative preference.
Normative preference embodies the criteria used by the agent to judge his own
welfare, and therefore, arguably, it is the appropriate guide for welfare policy. This
is in contrast with the traditional view that emphasizes choice as the appropriate
guide for welfare policy. Thus, the notions of normative preference and temptation
are of interest, and it is worthwhile to ask: what are the behavioral foundations
of normative preference? What behavior reveals that an agent struggles with two
preference orderings? How can normative preference be elicited from choices? How
can we identify what he ￿nds tempting? Pinning down these concepts in terms of
observable behavior makes it possible to supply empirical evidence in support of
hypotheses about agents with self-control problems.
1.1. The Commitment Approach
Gul and Pesendorfer (henceforth GP) are the ￿rst to provide foundations for a model
of temptation and self-control [10, 11]. The primitive of their model is a preference %
over Z, the space of menus (choice problems). A menu x 2 Z is a nonempty compact








The preference % dictates the agent￿ s choice of menu in period 0. After choosing a
menu x, he subsequently makes some choice c from x in period 1. Period 1 choice is
subject to temptation. GP hypothesize that the agent anticipates this in period 0,
and that period 0 behavior % contains information about both the agent￿ s normative
and temptation preferences over C.1
Speci￿cally, GP hypothesize that temptation creates a preference for commitment
in period 0.2 To illustrate this ￿ commitment approach￿ , consider an dieter who nor-
matively prefers having a salad s for dinner, but anticipates being tempted to have a
burger b if it is available. GP suggest that, in order to avoid temptation, this dieter
will commit to having s for dinner by, say, going to a restaurant that serves only s
rather than one that also serves b:
fsg ￿ fs;bg:
That is, period 1 temptation leads to a period 0 preference for commitment. This
choice in turn reveals to an observer the dieter￿ s normative preference for s and his
temptation preference for b.
This story rests on an assumption that we shall argue is problematic: the com-
mitment approach assumes that the agent experiences no temptation in period 0. In
GP￿ s words, ￿period 0 is ￿ special￿in the sense that it is a period prior to the experi-
ence of temptation￿[11, p 129]. This assumption is crucial. To see why, imagine that
although the dieter understands the value of commitment, he is nevertheless tempted
by the restaurant that serves burgers ￿in period 0 he is tempted to choose fs;bg over
fsg. This could be because the idea of having a burger b at dinner time tempts the
1What we refer to as normative preference, GP refer to as commitment preference; they interpret
commitment preference as representing the agent￿ s view of his long-run self-interest [11, p 120].
2Also see Strotz [23], Ainslie [2], Laibson [15] and O￿ Donoghue and Rabin [20].
4dieter now, so that he is tempted by the opportunity to indulge temptations later.
Indeed, if this temptation is strong enough, the dieter does not choose commitment:
fs;bg % fsg:
This demonstrates that when period 0 is not special, temptation may not create a
preference for commitment.
Thus, a special period 0 is a necessary ingredient in the commitment approach.
In particular, the primitive % of the approach is not just any ranking of menus, but
rather an agent￿ s ranking of menus in the absence of temptation.3 However, this
immediately raises several questions: Is % observable? Is it possible to distinguish
between a ranking of menus that is in the absence of temptation and one that is
not? Even if we could distinguish the two, what if we only observe rankings that are
subject to temptation? If it is indeed plausible that menus may tempt (that is, that
a dieter may ￿nd a restaurant tempting), observing % would require us to deduce
how agents would rank menus if they did not experience temptation. But, can this
be done?
To the extent that the preference % is not observable, adopting it as the primitive
of a model of temptation is problematic. The purpose of behavioral foundations is
to allow an observer to identify agents who experience temptation, and to elicit the
normative and temptation preferences underlying their choice. But, in order to serve
such a purpose, it is essential for the characterizations to be in terms of observable
behavior.
1.2. The Preference Reversal Approach
This paper suggests that there is another source of data that an observer can use to
elicit an agent￿ s normative and temptation preference. We describe this next. Let C
3This is equivalent to saying that GP￿ s primitive is a normative preference over menus. This
observation will be exploited in this paper.
5be a consumption set. For any c 2 C, let c+t represent an alternative that provides
c in t periods, and let the ranking of such alternatives be captured by a preference
ordering ’, the asymmetric and symmetric part of which is > and ￿, respectively.
Research in psychology has documented a behavior called preference reversals (see
Ainslie [2] for a survey of the evidence). In a typical experiment, subjects exhibit the







where a unit of time is, say, a month. That is, they prefer receiving an immediate
$20 to receiving $30 in one month, but reverse their preferences when both these
alternatives are pushed into the future by a month. Psychologists since Ainslie [1],
Rachlin [21] and Rachlin and Green [22] have interpreted preference reversals in terms
of temptation by immediate grati￿cation: A preference for $30 in two months over $20
in one month reveals that the subjects ￿nd the smaller earlier $20 reward inferior.
However, they switch preferences in favor of this same inferior reward when it is
available immediately.
Our main observation is that, although the temptation by the earlier reward could
not be resisted when subjects chose between $20 now and $30 in a month, resisting
it became possible when both rewards were (su¢ ciently) delayed. That is, preference
reversals reveal that delayed temptations are easier to resist than immediate tempta-
tions.
This suggests a way of deriving an agent￿ s normative preference from his choices.
From the agent￿ s ranking ’ of delayed consumption alternatives, derive a set of
preference relations f’tg1
t=0 over C as follows: for each c;b c 2 C and t ￿ 0,
c ’t b c () c
+t ’ b c
+t
Thus, each ’t ranks alternatives in C when these alternatives are delayed by t periods.
By the above observation, as t grows, the in￿ uence of temptation on the agent￿ s
6ranking ’t of alternatives diminishes. That is, as t grows, the temptation component
underlying ’t becomes less signi￿cant, and so, each ’t provides an increasingly better
approximation of the agent￿ s underlying normative preference. For this reason, it is




This serves as a behavioral de￿nition of normative preference, and a starting point
for providing foundations for a model of temptation.
To summarize, the hypothesis that ￿ delayed temptations are easier to resist than
immediate temptations￿is an alternative to GP￿ s hypothesis that ￿ temptation cre-
ates a preference for commitment￿ . It constitutes an alternative starting point for
characterizing agents with self-control problems, and eliciting their normative and
temptation preferences. A noteworthy feature of our approach is that its primitive is
empirically meaningful ￿the primitive constitutes choices that may well be subject
to temptation. In contrast, the commitment approach takes choices in the absence of
temptation as its primitive.
1.3. An Application
The literature on temptation has focused almost exclusively on agents who are tempted
only by immediate consumption (call them Current Temptation or CT agents). Con-
sider the possibility that agents may be tempted also by future consumption, that
is, they may be tempted also by opportunities of consuming tempting items in the
future (refer to such agents as Future Temptation or FT agents).
One reason to be interested in FT agents is as follows: CT agents always take ad-
vantage of commitment opportunities in order to deal with their self-control problems.
They do not care for temptations that lie in the future, and therefore have no reason
not to commit. However, as we saw in Section 1.1, temptation by future consumption
can induce agents with self-control problems to avoid taking advantage of commitment
7opportunities. When tomorrow￿ s drugs tempt an addict today, he may be tempted
not to commit to abstinence, that is, he may be tempted to retain the possibility of
consuming drugs later. This is reminiscent of the problem of non-compliance with
commitment-based treatment procedures among addicts: disul￿ram-based treatments
for alcoholics and naltexrone-based treatments for heroin and morphine addicts are
known to be of limited e⁄ectiveness, primarily because patients do not comply with
the disul￿rum or naltexrone regimen despite exhibiting a desire for the treatment
[2, 8, 9].
The fact that self-control problems may lead CT agents to seek commitment
and FT agents to avoid it suggests that the implications of temptation by future
consumption may be worth studying. But a prior question, which is the focus here, is
whether there exists any evidence of such temptation. We use the ideas in Section 1.2
to characterize CT and FT agents in terms of observable behavior. By contrasting
the axioms that characterize the two agents, we are able to identify the behaviors that
distinguish them. This, in turn, tells us what kind of evidence constitutes support
for temptation by future consumption. The result of our analysis is that supporting
evidence does indeed exist (Section 6 presents the evidence). The peculiarities of
temptation by future consumption include its implications for preference reversals
and the demand for mechanisms that ensure commitment in the future. Evidence
supporting such behavior comes from the preference reversals literature and from
experiments on saving behavior.
An auxiliary aim of this application is to explore what relationship exists, if any,
between the commitment approach and the approach outlined earlier. Roughly, this
is done in the following way. The two models we axiomatize are dynamic GP-style
models where menus are suitably de￿ned dynamic objects (in￿nite horizon choice
problems). Instead of adopting a GP-style preference % over menus as the primitive,
we adopt as the primitive a choice correspondence C that describes choices from
menus. These choices are possibly subject to temptation, and arguably are observable
8in principle. We ￿nd restrictions on the choice correspondence C that are necessary
and su¢ cient for it to be ￿ generated￿or ￿ rationalized￿by a GP-style preference %, in
a sense made precise in Section 2. This % is interpreted as describing how the agent
would rank menus in a hypothetical period 0 where no temptation is experienced. At
this point we can ask, for instance, how the normative preference derived from % by
the commitment approach is related to the normative preference derived from C by
our approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides formal
details of our model of Future Temptation, and Section 3 presents axioms and the
representation result. Section 4 outlines the proof of the representation theorem and
shows that in the model, GP￿ s and our approach yields the same normative preference.
Thus, our approach, in a sense, our approach provides a characterization of normative
preference that is dual to GP￿ s, and which is based on observable behavior. A model
of Current Temptation is axiomatized in Section 5. Evidence supporting temptation
by future consumption is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are
collected in appendices.
2. A Model of Future Temptation
In this section we ￿rst describe a GP-style model of temptation by future consump-
tion, that is, a model constructed using the commitment approach. We then demon-
strate the ￿ problem￿that arises from a special period 0 and conclude by describing a
way to avoid it.
For any compact metric space X, ￿(X) denotes the set of all probability measures
on the Borel ￿-algebra of X; endowed with the weak convergence topology; ￿(X) is
compact and metrizable [4]. Let K(X) denote the set of all nonempty compact subsets
of X. When endowed with the Hausdor⁄ topology, K(X) is a compact metric space
[6, p. 222].
9The set of consumption items is given by a compact metric space C. The set of
menus is Z. Each menu z 2 Z is a compact set of lotteries, where each lottery is a
measure over current consumption and a continuation menu ￿Z is homeomorphic to
K(￿(C ￿Z)). It is also a compact metric space. See [11] for the formal de￿nition of
Z. We often let ￿ denote ￿(C ￿ Z). The reader should take note of this.














The preference % dictates the choice of menu in period 0. The chosen menu x is faced
in period 1, and a choice from x is made. If the choice from x is (c;z), the agent
receives immediate consumption c, and a continuation menu z.4 The continuation
menu z is faced in period 2 and a choice is made from it. The process is repeated ad
in￿nitum.
Future Temptation Preferences
In [18], we axiomatize Future Temptation (FT) preferences. Say that % is an FT
preference if it has a representation W : Z ￿! R of the following form: there exist
￿ and ￿, 0 < ￿ < ￿ < 1, continuous functions u;v : C ￿! R, and continuous linear
















v(c) + ￿V (y)
￿
d￿(c;y);
V (x) = max
￿2x V (￿).
4More generally, if the chosen alternative is a nondegenerate lottery ￿ 2 ￿, then the uncer-
tainty plays out before the next period, yielding some (c;z). This leaves the agent with immediate
consumption c and the menu z to face in period 2.
10To understand the representation, ￿rst focus on the functional form of W(￿). Note
that W(f￿g) = U(￿) for any singleton menu f￿g. Thus U(￿) captures the agent￿ s util-
ity under commitment. Anticipating results in Section 4, we interpret U(￿) as a repre-
sentation of the agent￿ s normative preference, and henceforth refer to it as normative
utility.5 Interpreting V (￿) as temptation utility, the term jV (￿) ￿ max￿2z V (￿)j can
be understood as the cost of self-control, that is, the cost incurred when the most
tempting item in z is not chosen. Hence, (2.1) states that the utility W(x) of a menu
x is the maximum value of normative utility net of self-control cost.
Though W(￿) represents the agent￿ s choice of menu in some period 0, it is sugges-
tive of how the agent makes his choice from a menu: it suggests that he maximizes
normative utility net of self-control costs. Since the term ￿ max￿2x V (￿)￿in (2.1) is a
constant when x is given, maximizing over ￿ in x essentially maximizes
U(￿) + V (￿):
That is, when choosing from a menu x, the agent ￿nds a compromise between re-
specting his normative preference and submitting to his temptation preference.
According to the functional form of U(￿), normative utility depends on utility
from current consumption and the utility W(￿) from a continuation menu discounted
by ￿. Temptation utility V (￿) depends on current consumption and the temptation
value V (￿) of a continuation menu discounted by ￿. As the form of V (￿) shows, a
continuation menu is as tempting as the most tempting alternative contained in it.
Thus, in this model, future consumption tempts the agent via menus. The restriction
￿ < ￿ embodies the property that it is easier to resist a temptation when it is pushed
into the future. The functional form with ￿ = 0 is a representation of GP￿ s Dy-
namic Self-Control (DSC) Preferences [11], which exhibit temptation by immediate
consumption only. DSC preferences are not a special case of FT preferences since the
latter require ￿ > 0.
5GP call it ￿ commitment utility￿ .
11To summarize, the agent￿ s period 0 ranking of menus is represented by W(￿) and
his choice from menus in each subsequent period t > 0 is captured by the choice
correspondence C(￿;%) over Z de￿ned by
C(z;%) = argmax
z2x fU(￿) + V (￿)g; (2.2)
for all z 2 Z.6 Each alternative ￿ in a menu z yields normative and temptation
utility, and the agent￿ s choice from the menu tries to balance the two. For a simple
illustration, consider a menu f(c;x);(c;y)g where there is no choice of immediate
consumption, the continuation menu x gives the opportunity to indulge temptations
later, and the continuation menu y o⁄ers commitment (imagine that y corresponds to
entering rehabilitation and that x corresponds to not entering rehabilitation). Since
x contains more tempting items than y, the functional form of V (￿) implies that
the temptation utility of (c;x) is higher than that of (c;y). On the other hand, the
functional form of U(￿) implies that the normative utility of (c;y) is higher than that
of (c;x) ￿normative utility U(￿) evaluates continuation menus according to W(￿), and
the presence of temptation in a menu reduces its value according to W(￿).7 Thus,
normative and temptation preferences disagree over the choice from f(c;x);(c;y)g,
that is, the agent experiences temptation (by (c;x)). The eventual choice lies in
C(f(c;x);(c;y)g;%).
A Question of Foundations
We demonstrate in the context of the FT model that period 0 is special in that it
is a period where no temptation is experienced. Begin by recalling that the period 0
6Though C(￿;%) is de￿ned in terms of one representation of %, it does not depend on the par-
ticular representation. To see this, call (U;V ) a representation of %. If % exhibits a preference for
commitment (x ￿ x [ y for some x;y) then by [10, Thm 4], (U0;V 0) is another representation of %
if and only if there exists ￿ > 0 and ￿U;￿V such that U0 = ￿U + ￿U and V 0 = ￿V + ￿V : If % does
not exhibit a preference for commitment, then without loss of generality, V = 0, and U is unique
up to an a¢ ne transformation. In either case, any representation of % would give rise to the same
C(￿;%).
7Note that temptation utility enters W(￿) only in the form of a cost.
12ranking % of menus is represented by
W(￿): (2.3)
A ranking of menus can also be obtained in any period t > 0 by observing the agent￿ s
choice from menus of the following type:
f(c;x);(c;y)g:
Since no choice of current consumption is involved, the choice from this menu is a
choice between menus x and y in some period t > 0. The choice is determined by
C(f(c;x);(c;y)g;%), that is, by solving
max
f(c;x);(c;y)g
fu(￿) + ￿W(￿) + v(￿) + ￿V (￿)g:





Compare (2.3) and (2.4) and conclude that, in general, the ranking of menus in
period 0 is di⁄erent from that in any period t > 0.8 Since V (￿) captures temptation
utility from menus, it is evident that the agent￿ s ranking of menus in period 0 is not
subject to temptation (that is, period 0 is special), whereas temptation a⁄ects his
ranking in all subsequent periods.
Thus, the characterization of the FT model o⁄ered in [18] involves restrictions on
the ranking of menus in the absence of temptation. In order to verify that an agent
has FT preferences, one needs to obtain this ranking. But how can this be done?
If there exists some period 0, how can it be identi￿ed? How do we tell whether an
agent￿ s choices are in the absence of temptation or not? In fact, can we even expect
a period 0 to exist? An agent who is tempted by menus will, in general, experience
such temptation in all periods. In such a scenario, we would need to deduce how he
8Though V (￿) has a speci￿c functional form in this example, the argument reveals that such a
discrepancy arises generically in extensions of DSC preferences that permit temptation by menus.
13would behave in the absence of temptation. How this can be done is not obvious, and
thus it is not clear that the FT model￿ s primitive preference % is observable.9
Alternative Foundations
In order to avoid this problem associated with a special period 0, we drop the
period 0 preference % as the primitive of the model. We consider an alternative
characterization of FT preferences that is in terms of restrictions on period t > 0
choice from menus, instead of period 0 choice of menus. These period t > 0 choices
are potentially subject to temptation, and thus describe choices that are observable
in principle. Let the choices in each period t > 0 be summarized by a (time-invariant)
choice correspondence C(￿) over Z. For any choice correspondence C(￿) and any FT
preference %, say that % generates C(￿) if,
C(￿) = C(￿;%);
where C(￿;%) is de￿ned by (2.2). Our problem is to ￿nd restrictions on C(￿) that
imply the existence of an FT preference % that generates C(￿). That is, under what
conditions on C(￿) can we say that, in a hypothetical period 0 where no temptation is
experienced, the agent￿ s ranking of menus % is an FT preference? These restrictions
on C(￿) allow us to obtain the FT preference % and the special period 0 as parts
of a representation result. In particular, we need not assume the existence of such a
period nor take such a preference as the primitive.
It is also noteworthy that such restrictions on C(￿) constitute revealed preference
foundations for the FT model in the following sense. In standard revealed preference
theory, we start with some class of preferences de￿ned over a set of alternatives, say
￿, and for each preference ’ in this class we de￿ne a choice correspondence C￿(￿;’)
over K(￿) by
C
￿(x;’) = f￿ 2 x : ￿ ’ ￿ for all ￿ 2 xg;
9GP note that DSC preferences do not su⁄er from this problem: when only immediate consump-
tion is tempting (￿ = 0), problems (2.3) and (2.4) are identical.
14for each x 2 K(￿). Then, we characterize the choice correspondences that can be
￿ rationalized￿or ￿ generated￿by a preference in the class, that is, we ￿nd conditions
that must be satis￿ed by a correspondence C(￿) in order for there to exist a preference
’ over ￿ such that
C(￿) = C
￿(￿;’):
In an analogous fashion, we are starting with a class of preferences (namely, FT
preferences), de￿ning an appropriate choice correspondence C(￿;%), and seeking to
characterize the choice correspondences that may be ￿ generated￿by FT preferences.
The exercise is nonstandard only in that an FT preference is de￿ned over the space
of menus K(￿) rather than over the space of alternatives ￿.
The primitive of the model is a choice correspondence C(￿) that describes choices
that are subject to temptation, and yet we want to derive from these choices a pref-
erence ordering % that represents how the agent would rank menus in the absence of
temptation. As we will see in Section 4, such a derivation is achieved by exploiting
the ideas contained in Section 1.2. In particular, we obtain the preference % in the
form of a normative preference over menus.
3. Axioms and Representation Result
Generic elements of Z are x;y;z whereas generic elements of ￿ are ￿;￿;￿. For
￿ 2 [0;1], ￿￿+(1￿￿)￿ 2 ￿ is the measure that assigns ￿￿(A)+(1￿￿)￿(A) to each
A in the Borel ￿-algebra of C ￿ Z. Similarly, ￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)y ￿ f￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ : ￿ 2
x;￿ 2 yg 2 Z is a mixture of the choice problems x and y. Denote these mixtures
more simply by ￿￿￿ and x￿y respectively.
The primitive of the model is a closed-valued choice correspondence C : Z  
￿(C ￿ Z) where, for all x 2 Z, C(x) 6= ￿ and C(x) ￿ x. This is a time-invariant
choice correspondence that captures the choices an agent would make out of menus
at any time t = 1;2::: (see the time-line in Section 2). Thus, our model is dynamic.
We introduce some notation to aid exposition:
15￿ Fix c 2 C throughout. For any x, de￿ne x+1 ￿ (c;x) and inductively for t > 1,
x+t = (c;x+(t￿1)). Then x+t 2 ￿ is the alternative that yields menu x after t > 0
periods, and c in all periods between time 0 and t. We write f￿g+t as ￿+t and identify
￿+0 with ￿. The reader should keep in mind that x+t is not a menu, but a degenerate
lottery. That is, it is not an element of Z but rather an element of ￿.
￿ The option that gives x [ y (resp. x￿y), after t periods is denoted (x [ y)+t
(resp. (x￿y)+t).
￿ Let ’ denote the revealed preference relation (de￿ned on ￿) that is generated
by choices from binary menus, that is,
￿ ’ ￿ () ￿ 2 C(f￿;￿g): (3.1)
The indi⁄erence relation t and the strict preference relation > are derived from ’
in the usual way.
Consider the following axioms on C(￿). The quanti￿ers ￿ for all ￿;￿ 2 ￿; x;y 2 Z;
c;c0;c00 2 C; and ￿ 2 [0;1]￿should be understood.
Axiom 1 (WARP). If ￿;￿ 2 x \ y, ￿ 2 C(x) and ￿ 2 C(y), then ￿ 2 C(y):
This is the familiar Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference. It is a minimal con-
sistency requirement on choices. The axiom states that for ￿ and ￿ that are both
contained in menus x and y, if ￿ is revealed preferred to ￿ (that is, if it is chosen
from x) then ￿ cannot be revealed preferred to ￿ (that is, if it is chosen from y then ￿
must have also been chosen). Though WARP is a standard axiom in standard choice
theory, we must inquire whether it is appropriate for a theory of choice under temp-
tation. Consider the following example. Assuming a static set-up, let s represent a
salad, b a burger, and B a large burger. The agent normatively prefers s to b and b
to B, but ￿nds B more tempting than b, and b more tempting than s. For simplicity,
assume that C(￿) is single-valued. The following choices violate WARP:
fsg = C(fs;bg) and fbg = C(fs;b;Bg):
16Yet, the choices are not unreasonable. Since b is not so tempting, he is able to apply
self-control and choose s out of fs;bg. But when faced with fs;b;Bg, the presence of
B whets his appetite for a burger. In order to compromise between his craving for
the large burger B and his normative preference for s, he settles for b.
This example is one where self-control is menu-dependent ￿the presence of B
a⁄ects the agent￿ s ability to resist b. Although WARP excludes such behavior, we
note that it is still consistent with other aspects of decision-making under temptation
and thus it may be an acceptable axiom. In the above example, WARP would not
be violated if the choice from fs;b;Bg was di⁄erent from b, that is, if either fBg =
C(fs;b;Bg) or fsg = C(fs;b;Bg). These cases capture the following stories: In the
￿rst case, B is so tempting that it cannot be resisted, and in the second case, B is
not that much more tempting than b, and thus can be resisted along with b.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). C(￿) is upper hemicontinuous.
Upper hemicontinuity of C(￿) is implied by choices being determined by the maxi-
mization of a continuous preference.10 We impose upper hemicontinuity as an axiom,
with the intention of establishing that choices are determined in such a way.
Axiom 3 (Independence). ￿ > ￿ =) ￿￿￿ > ￿￿￿:
This is the familiar Independence axiom.




















Separability states that when comparing two lotteries (delayed by t ￿ 0 periods),
the agent only cares about the marginal distributions on C and Z induced by the
lotteries. That is, only marginals matter, and correlations between consumption and
continuation menus do not a⁄ect the agent￿ s choices.
10Formally, upper hemicontinuity implies that if fxng is a sequence of menus converging to x, and
￿n 2 C(fxng) for each n, then the sequence f￿ng has a limit point in C(fxg).





Under both rewards x+t￿y+t and (x￿y)+t, the agent faces x after t periods with
probability ￿ and y after t periods with probability (1￿￿). However, under x+t￿y+t,
the uncertainty will be resolved today, whereas under (x￿y)+t, the uncertainty will be
resolved after t periods. That is, the two rewards di⁄er only in the timing of resolution
of uncertainty. Indi⁄erence between the rewards corresponds to indi⁄erence to the
timing of resolution of uncertainty.




+t ’ (x [ y)
+t ’ y
+t:
Moreover, there exists x;y such that x+1 > (x [ y)+1 > y+1.
Set-Betweenness expresses the idea that the agent anticipates experiencing temp-
tation when choosing out of some menus in the future, and may exert self-control
when making such choices. To illustrate, ￿x some delay t > 0, and consider ￿;￿ 2 ￿
such that f￿g+t > f￿;￿g+t: The preference for commitment to ￿ reveals that ￿ is
tempting. If we also observe the ranking f￿;￿g+t t f￿g+t, then it implies that the
agent would choose the same item whether faced with f￿;￿g or f￿g. That is, choice
from f￿;￿g is ￿ and so, the agent succumbs to temptation. On the other hand, the
ranking f￿;￿g+t > f￿g+t would suggest that ￿ is chosen from f￿;￿g and so, the agent
resists temptation, that is, he exerts self-control.
GP would interpret the ranking f￿g+t t f￿;￿g+t ’ f￿g+t as saying that no
temptation is experienced in the menu f￿;￿g. However, this ranking permits another
interpretation as well: when future consumption is tempting, it is also consistent with
an overwhelming temptation by ￿. The story is that the reward ￿ is so tempting that
he prefers f￿;￿g+t over f￿g+t, that is, he submits to the temptation of the menu
f￿;￿g that contains the tempting reward ￿. The indi⁄erence between f￿g+t and
18f￿;￿g+t is another expression of the overwhelming temptation by ￿ ￿he foresees that
he will choose ￿ in either menu, which is why he is indi⁄erent between them.
The second part of Set-Betweenness is a nondegeneracy condition. It states that
there are menus x and y such that the agent anticipates experiencing temptation and
exerting self-control in x [ y.
Axiom 7 (Sophistication). If f￿g+t > f￿g+t, then
f￿;￿g
+t > f￿g
+t () ￿ > ￿:
As the name suggests, this axiom connects the agent￿ s expectation of his future
choices with his actual choices.11 The left-hand-side ranking reveals that the agent
anticipates choosing ￿ if, after t periods, he faces the menu f￿;￿g. Since C(￿) is
time-invariant, the actual choice from f￿;￿g after t periods is given by C(￿). Thus,
￿ > ￿ says that after t periods, the agent￿ s actual choice from f￿;￿g is ￿. That is,
the axiom says that the agent￿ s anticipated choice and actual choice coincide.
To see that the hypothesis that f￿g+t > f￿g+t is required in order to to interpret
the axiom as one capturing sophistication, suppose that it is dropped. Then ￿ t ￿ is
consistent with the possibility that f￿g+t > f￿;￿g+t t f￿g+t, which does not preclude
an expectation to strictly prefer ￿ when choosing from f￿;￿g after t periods.
Axiom 8 (Menus Can Tempt).
x
+t > (x [ y)






The axiom embodies the idea that future consumption tempts the agent in the
form of a temptation by menus ￿the presence of tempting alternatives in a menu
11It should be noted that this axiom is dynamic in that it relates choice across di⁄erent times.
All the other axioms are static as they deal with choice at a given time. Also, it should be clear
that the axiom does not contradict preference reversals (Axiom 9 below). Preference reversals are a
restriction on static choice.
19makes the menu tempting. The preference for commitment exhibited by the left-
hand-side ranking implies that the menu y contains tempting alternatives. The right-
hand-side ranking states that y is a tempting menu. Thus, the axiom states that
we observe y being tempting if and only if we also observe it containing tempting
alternatives.
Axiom 9 (Reversal). If ￿ / ￿ and ￿+T ’ ￿+T with at least one ranking strict, then
￿+t > ￿+t for all t > T. Moreover, there exists some ￿;￿ and T such that ￿ / ￿ and
￿+T > ￿+T .
This axiom imposes the structure of preference reversals on C(￿). That is, if
pushing a pair of rewards into the future changes its ranking, then the reversed
ranking is maintained for all subsequent delays in the rewards. Following the evidence
on preference reversals, the axiom allows no more than one reversal for any pair of
rewards. Post-preference reversal indi⁄erence is ruled out. The second part of the
axiom requires that the agent exhibit a preference reversal for at least one pair of
rewards.
As a simple consequence of Reversal we obtain a function ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ! R such
that for any pair of rewards ￿;￿, ￿(￿;￿) is the number of periods that ￿ and ￿ need
to be delayed before a preference reversal is observed; if no reversal is observed, then
￿(￿;￿) = 0. For instance, if ￿ > ￿, ￿+1 ’ ￿+1 and ￿+t < ￿+t for all t > 1, then
￿(￿;￿) = 2. For a precise de￿nition of the function ￿, see Appendix B.
Before stating the ￿nal axiom, we make an observation that will assist us in its
interpretation. Suppose that an agent exhibits ￿ > ￿ for some ￿;￿. What can we
expect to observe if this ranking respects normative preference? We suggest that the
function ￿ will satisfy the following property (￿) at (￿;￿):
￿(￿;￿) = 0 and ￿ is continuous at (￿;￿): (￿)
To understand why, ￿rst note that the ranking ￿ > ￿ respects normative preference
only if the choice between ￿ and ￿ is not subject to overwhelming temptation, that
20is, only if either there is no temptation, or ￿ is tempting but not overwhelmingly so.
Also recall that a preference reversal occurs when the choice between two rewards is
overwhelmed by temptation ￿we observe a preference reversal when pushing rewards
into the future makes resistible an otherwise overwhelming temptation. If the choice
between ￿ and ￿ is not overwhelmed by temptation, then pushing ￿ and ￿ into
the future should not a⁄ect their ranking. That is, if the choice between ￿ and ￿
re￿ ects normative preference, we should observe no preference reversal, ￿(￿;￿) = 0.
Furthermore, if temptation does not overwhelm the choice between the pair of rewards
(￿;￿), then under the presumed continuity of underlying temptation and normative
preference, it should not overwhelm the choice between neighboring pairs of rewards
either. That is, we should expect to observe no preference reversal for any pairs
of rewards in some neighborhood of (￿;￿).12 This condition is equivalent to the
statement that ￿ is continuous at (￿;￿).
Now we state the ￿nal axiom.
Axiom 10 (Commitment is Normative). If x+t > (x [ y)+t, then ￿ satis￿es
property (￿) at (x+t;(x [ y)+t). Moreover, if x+t > (x [ y)+t > y+t, then ￿ satis-
￿es property (￿) at ((x [ y)+t;y+t):
The ranking x+t > (x [ y)+t reveals not only that x [ y is a menu that contains
temptations, but also that x[y is not an overwhelmingly tempting menu; if it were, we
would have observed (x[y)+t ’ x+t. Hence, a t period delay makes the temptation by
x[y resistible. Consequently, the choice between x+t and (x[y)+t is not overwhelmed
by temptation, and thus, their ranking re￿ ects normative preference. Given the above
discussion, this in turn should imply the noted restrictions on the function ￿ at the
point (x+t;(x [ y)+t). To understand the second part of the axiom, observe that the
ranking x+t > (x[y)+t also reveals that y contains temptations, and that a t period
delay in y makes the temptation by y resistible. It follows that the choice between
12In other words, for any sequence f(￿n;￿n)g converging to (￿;￿), there is some N such that
n ￿ N implies ￿(￿n;￿n) = 0.
21(x [ y)+t and y+t is not overwhelmed by temptation, and thus, the ranking of the
rewards re￿ ects normative preference as well.
Finally, say that a binary relation % de￿ned over Z is an FT preference if, ￿rstly,
it has an FT representation (Section 2) and, secondly, it is nondegenerate in the sense
that there exists x;y 2 Z such that13
x ￿ x [ y ￿ y:
Recall from Section 2 that an FT preference % generates C(￿) if,
C(￿) = C(￿;%);
where C(￿;%) is de￿ned by (2.2). Theorem 3.1 is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 3.1. A choice correspondence C(￿) satis￿es Axioms 1-10 if and only if there
exists an FT preference % that generates it. Furthermore, each such C(￿) is generated
by a unique FT preference %.
Theorem 3.1 states that an agent whose choice correspondence satis￿es Axioms
1-10 can be viewed as an FT agent, and conversely, the choices of an FT agent satisfy
Axioms 1-10. An equivalent restatement of the Theorem is: a choice correspondence
C(￿) satis￿es Axioms 1-10 if and only if there exist functions U(￿) and V (￿) as in the
representation of an FT preference such that for any menu x 2 Z,
C(x) = argmax
￿2x fU(￿) + V (￿)g:
Note that U(￿) + V (￿) represents the order ’ de￿ned by (3.1).
The functions U(￿) and V (￿) constitute a decomposition of the agent￿ s choices into
its respective normative and temptation component; the Theorem assures us that
13In terms of the representation, this is equivalent to the condition that U(￿) and V (￿) are noncon-
stant and U(￿) is not an a¢ ne transformation of V (￿), where U(￿) and V (￿) are as in the representation
of FT preferences. See Lemma C.2.
22the normative and temptation preference delivered by the decomposition are unique,
since two distinct FT agents cannot share the same choice correspondence.14 The
next section outlines the proof of the Theorem and justi￿es our interpretation of U(￿)
as normative utility. This in turn justi￿es our interpretation of V (￿) as temptation
utility: since choice maximizes U(￿)+V (￿), the function V (￿) captures the component
of choice that, in some sense, is not ￿ explained￿by normative preference.
We have provided foundations for the FT model that are an alternative to those
in [18], where a preference over menus was taken as the primitive. In order to check
whether an agent is an FT agent, we do not need any data on how he would behave
in the absence of temptation. All we need is to check that his actual choices, summa-
rized by a choice correspondence, satisfy Axioms 1-10. In this sense, the foundations
provided here are empirically more meaningful.
4. FT Preference and Normative Preference
Turn to the construction of the FT preference % in Theorem 3.1. The construction
is based on the behavioral de￿nition of normative preference presented in the Intro-
duction. This section also shows that this de￿nition allows us to interpret U(￿) as
normative utility.
The FT preference % is derived from C(￿) in 3 steps.
Step 1: Derive a set of preference relations f’tg1
t=0 over ￿, where for each t ￿ 0
and ￿;￿ 2 ￿,




For any ￿;￿ 2 ￿, the preference ’t ranks ￿ and ￿ when both rewards are to
be received t periods later. Thus, f’tg captures how the agent￿ s current period
preference over ￿ changes as ￿ is pushed into the future, so to speak.
Step 2: Derive the normative preference %￿ over ￿:
14Also see the uniqueness properties of the FT representation in footnote 6.
23By the Reversal axiom, C(￿) exhibits preference reversals. As argued in the In-
troduction, preference reversals manifest the ability to resist delayed temptations.
Thus, the ￿ limit￿of the sequence f’tg as t goes to in￿nity describes how an agent
ranks elements of ￿ in the absence of temptation. Since choice respects normative
preference when temptation is absent, the agent￿ s normative preference %￿ over ￿
may be identi￿ed with this limit.
To be formal about the de￿nition of %￿, say that a binary relation B on ￿ is
nonempty if ￿B￿ for some ￿;￿ 2 ￿. Following Hildenbrand [12], identify any non-
empty continuous binary relation on ￿ with its graph, a nonempty compact subset
of ￿￿￿. Thus, the space of nonempty continuous preferences on ￿ can be identi￿ed
with P = K(￿ ￿ ￿), the space of nonempty compact subsets of ￿ ￿ ￿ endowed
with the Hausdor⁄ metric topology. See Appendix A for details. Think of f’tg as a
sequence in P:
De￿nition 4.1. The normative preference %￿ over ￿ is the limit of f’tg:
The existence of normative preference obtains under WARP, Continuity and Re-
versal alone. Reversal requires that for every ￿;￿ 2 ￿, the post-preference reversal
preferences agree on the ranking of ￿ and ￿. This implies that for every ￿;￿ 2 ￿,
there exists T such that all preferences ’t, t ￿ T, agree on the ranking of ￿ and ￿. In
a sense, the di⁄erence between ’t and ’t+1 decreases as t grows, since ’t and ’t+1
agree on the ranking of more and more pairs of rewards. This provides intuition for
why normative preference exists.
Step 3: Derive % over Z:
The preference % in Theorem 3.1 is meant to capture the agent￿ s ranking of menus
in the absence of temptation. Since choice in the absence of temptation respects nor-
mative preference, the desired preference % is in fact the agent￿ s normative preference
over menus. That is, % is simply the ranking over Z induced by %￿:




24for all x;y 2 Z. Thus, we say x % y if and only if normative preference ranks the
x+1 higher than y+1. Recall that x+1 and y+1 are degenerate lotteries in ￿ that yield
some common immediate consumption c and the respective menus x and y in the
next period.
Theorem 3.1 establishes that under Axioms 1-10 imposed on C(￿), the preference
% is a well-de￿ned FT preference. The latter is veri￿ed by checking that % satis￿es
the axioms in [18]. Commitment is Normative and Sophistication play key roles in
establishing that % generates C(￿). To see this, recall from the discussion following
Set Betweenness that the choices an agent anticipates making from menus is revealed
by a ranking of menus. That is, a ranking of menus generates an ￿ anticipated choice
correspondence￿ . Like %￿, each ’t induces a ranking over Z, and thus generates a
choice correspondence. Sophistication ensures that each ’t generates the same choice
correspondence, namely, C(￿). Commitment is Normative ensures that % generates
the same choice correspondence as each ’t. The assertion follows.
This completes the derivation of %. Now turn to the justi￿cation of our interpre-
tation of the function U as normative utility.
For any FT preference %, a normative preference %￿ is said to be elicited from
C(￿;%) if it is derived as follows: First, a choice correspondence C(￿;%) is derived from
% by de￿ning it as in (2.2). Then, a set of preference relations f’tg1
t=0 de￿ned over
￿ is obtained from C(￿;%) as in Step 1 above, and ￿nally, %￿ is de￿ned as in Step 2.
Call (U;V ) a representation of the FT preference % if U and V are as in the
FT representation (2.1). Theorem 4.2 establishes that U represents the normative
preference %￿ elicited from C(￿;%).
Theorem 4.2. If (U;V ) represents an FT preference %, and %￿ is the normative
preference elicited from C(￿;%), then U represents %￿ :
Put di⁄erently, if we start with a choice correspondence C(￿) and derive a nor-
mative preference %￿ from it, and if this choice correspondence is generated by an
25FT preference % with representation (U;V ), then U represents %￿. This justi￿es our
referring to U as normative utility. However, Theorem 4.2 is of interest also for other
reasons. Recall from Section 2 that for any ￿ 2 ￿, U(￿) = W(f￿g), where W is
de￿ned by (2.1). Thus, for any ￿;￿ 2 ￿;
U(￿) ￿ U(￿) () f￿g % f￿g:
That is, U represents the agent￿ s preference under commitment in a special period
0. GP [11] informally interpret U as capturing the agent￿ s view of his long-run self-
interest ￿they identify normative preference with commitment preference. In terms
of the example of the dieter in the Introduction, the dieter is said to have a normative
preference for a salad s according to GP￿ s de￿nition if he would commit to s rather
than to b in a special period 0. Theorem 4.2 provides formal justi￿cation for such a
de￿nition of normative preference, albeit in the context of the FT model.
Theorem 4.2 also establishes that our de￿nition of normative preference is, in some
sense, dual to GP￿ s. The normative preference that would be derived by applying
GP￿ s de￿nition in a special period 0 is the same as that derived by applying our
de￿nition in any period t > 0. The discussion in Sections 1.1 and 2 about the non-
observability of the period 0 preference % implies that GP￿ s de￿nition of normative
preference may be based on unobservables. Theorem 4.2 tells us that ours is a dual
de￿nition in terms of observables.
5. A Model of Current Temptation
Having modeled an agent who is tempted by future consumption, we now model one
who is tempted only by immediate consumption. The primitive is a choice corre-
spondence C(￿) as before. The axioms imposed on C(￿) coincide with those of the FT
model, except that Menus Can Tempt and Reversal are replaced with the following
two axioms.
As noted in Section 3, Menus Can Tempt captures temptation by future consump-




for some x;y and t. Such a ranking expresses a demand for delayed commitment:
Under f(c;x);(c;y)g+t, the agent has the opportunity to decide after t periods whether
to face x in the (t + 1)th period or y. Under f(c;x)g+t, the agent is committed to
facing x in the (t + 1)th period. Therefore, the above ranking indicates the agent￿ s
desire to commit to a future menu in advance. Menus Can Tempt reveals the reason
for this: y contains tempting alternatives. Since future temptations a⁄ect the agent
today, he is tempted by the menu y, and thus he would rather avoid having to choose
between x and y. The following axiom rules out a demand for delayed commitment.




That is, while agents who are tempted by future consumption bene￿t from re-
stricting their choice of continuation menus, agents who are not tempted by future
consumption have no motivation to do the same. Continuation menus do not tempt
them ￿continuation menus contain future consumption items, and such items do
not tempt the agent today. Hence, they ￿nd no bene￿t in restricting the choice of
continuation menus available to them in the future.






The axiom strengthens (the ￿rst part of) Reversal by imposing a stationarity
property on the ranking of any pair of delayed alternatives.15 Thus, if x+1 ’ y+1,
15Given Preferences Reverse Tomorrow, Axioms 5-7 and 11 can be weakened by restricting their
statements to hold only for t = 1, and Axiom 10 can be dropped altogether. In order to facilitate
comparison with the FT model, we retain the stronger statements.
27then no subsequent delay in x and y leads to a preference reversal. Stated di⁄erently,
the axioms implies ￿(￿;￿) ￿ 1 for all ￿;￿, where ￿ captures the time of a reversal,
as before. This says that delaying a pair of alternatives by a single period su¢ ces
to induce a reversal, and if no reversal is observed, no subsequent delay will induce
one. This is to be expected when only immediate consumption is tempting. To see
why, suppose ￿ > ￿, where ￿ is overwhelmingly tempting. When both ￿ and ￿ are
delayed by one period, they become future rewards, and since the agent is tempted
only by immediate rewards, he experiences no temptation by ￿+1 and so reverses his
preferences: ￿+1 < ￿+1.
Turn to the representation. Let %CT be a binary relation over Z that is represented
by some function W CT : Z ￿! R. Say that %CT is a Current Temptation (CT)
preference if it is nondegenerate (in the sense of Section 3), and there exists ￿ 2 (0;1),
￿ ￿ 0 and continuous functions u;v : C ￿! R such that for all x 2 Z,
W
CT(x) = max


















CT preferences di⁄er from FT preferences in two ways. First, ￿ may be zero
here, yielding GP￿ s Dynamic Self-Control preferences where current consumption is
the only source of temptation utility. Second, if ￿ > 0, then the temptation utility
of a continuation menu coincides with the normative utility of the menu, as opposed
to the FT model where it coincides with the maximum temptation utility achievable
in the menu. Note that for CT preferences, if ￿ > 0, then normative and temptation
preferences never disagree when it comes to choosing between continuation menus,
and hence, continuation menus do not tempt. In particular, future consumption does
not tempt.
28Call (U;V ) a representation of the CT preference %CT, where U and V have the
above functional forms. As before, if (U;V ) represents %CT, say that %CT generates
C(￿) if
C(x) = argmax
￿2x fU(￿) + V (￿)g:
Theorem 5.1 is the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.1. A choice correspondence C(￿) satis￿es Axioms 1-7 and 10-12 if and
only if there exists a CT preference %CT that generates C(￿). Furthermore, each such
C(￿) is generated by a unique CT preference %CT.
CT preferences reduce to DSC preferences when ￿ = 0, and to the model of
preferences studied by Krussel, Kurus￿u and Smith [14] when ￿ > 0. Theorem 5.1 tells
us that these are models of agents who are tempted only by immediate consumption,
and furthermore, in our set-up, these are the only models of this type.
For completeness, we show that the result in Theorem 4.2 holds for CT preferences
as well. The de￿nition of ￿ normative preference %￿ is elicited from C(￿;%CT)￿is
analogous to the counterpart in the previous section.
Theorem 5.2. If (U;V ) represents a CT preference %CT, and %￿ is the normative
preference elicited from C(￿;%CT), then U is a representation of %￿ :
6. Evidence
The foundations of the FT and CT model reveal that CT agents must di⁄er from FT
agents when it comes to satisfying Axioms 8 and 9. That is, the two types of agents
di⁄er at least in their demand for delayed commitment and their time-of-reversal
functions ￿. We use this information to provide evidence of temptation by future
consumption.
Time of Preference Reversals: A large amount of experimental evidence in
psychology supports the claim that agents discount future rewards by using a hy-
29perbolic discount function.16 In what follows, we restrict attention to Mazur￿ s [17]
version of the hyperbolic discounting functional form, which has ￿t experimental ev-
idence particularly well. According to his formulation, a reward that is delayed by d




where k parameterizes the subject￿ s sensitivity to delay.
Let s+0 denote a small immediate reward s, and let l+d denote a large reward
l available with a delay of d periods. If a subject chooses s+0 over l+d, then the
hyperbolic discount function implies that in order to induce a preference reversal,




s(1 + kd) ￿ l
k(l ￿ s)
;
and where k is a parameter that captures the subject￿ s ￿ sensitivity￿to delay. Thus,
b ￿(s+0;l+d) is the time-of-reversal function implied by hyperbolic discounting. Observe
that b ￿(s+0;l+d) is increasing in s and d, and decreasing in l. The empirical evidence on
hyperbolic discounting serves as indirect empirical evidence in favor of these properties
of b ￿ . Some direct evidence may be found in Ainslie and Haendel [3].
How does the ￿ function of CT and FT agents compare to the b ￿ function above?




16See Ainslie [2] for an overview of the literature.
17The necessary and su¢ cient condition for a preference reversal to be observed for (￿;￿) is that
the agent be overwhelmed by temptation when choosing between the rewards. This is equivalent to
the condition
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) 2 (0;1], where U(￿) and V (￿) are as in the CT or FT representation, and
where without loss of generality, U(￿) ￿ U(￿).










where U(￿) and V (￿) are as in the FT representation. That is, for CT agents, a single
period delay su¢ ces to induce a reversal whereas for FT agents, the required delay
depends on the rewards and on the agent￿ s discount factors.
First, we inquire whether the ￿FT function shares the same properties as b ￿. To
permit a comparison, identify s+0 with the consumption stream in ￿ that gives imme-
diate consumption s and some ￿xed consumption c for all future periods. Similarly,
identify l+d with the consumption stream that gives l after d periods and ￿xed con-
sumption c in all other periods. For expositional simplicity, suppose u(c) = v(c) = 0.












If u(￿) and v(￿) are strictly increasing functions, then the ￿FT function makes the
same qualitative predictions as b ￿, that is, ￿FT is increasing in s and d and decreasing
in l. The greater the value of s or d, or the smaller the value of l, the more tempting
the small reward is, and so, the greater the number of periods of delay required in
order to induce a preference reversal. Observe that the role of k in b ￿ is played by
￿
￿ in
￿FT. Apparently, the ￿ sensitivity￿to delay corresponds to how fast temptation utility
is discounted (relative to normative utility) when rewards are pushed into the future.
Thus, ￿FT shares the same features as b ￿, while ￿CT clearly does not. This supports
the idea that agents are tempted by future consumption.
It is worth noting that the evidence reveals that temptation by future consumption
is not restricted to a short time horizon. For instance, Ainslie and Haendel [3] and
18Strictly speaking, since time is discrete, ￿FT should be rounded o⁄ to the next integer. The
same is true for b ￿.
31Kirby and Hernnstein [13, Experiment 3] ￿nd that the time of a reversal may be
in years ￿the latter uncovers a preference reversal at almost 3:5 years delay. That
is, it may take a delay of 3:5 years before the temptation of a reward is resistible,
suggesting that rewards that are that far in the future may tempt.
Demand for Delayed Commitment: CT agents do not exhibit a demand for
delayed commitment, while FT agents may. That is, for FT agents there may exist




The results of Benartzi and Thaler [5] may be interpreted as evidence supporting
a demand for delayed commitment. The authors introduce a saving-enhancement
plan, called the ￿ Save More TomorrowTM (SMT) plan￿ . Subjects in a ￿rm are given
the opportunity to commit in advance to allocating a portion of their future salary
increases towards a de￿ned-contributions plan. Any withdrawals one makes from a
de￿ned-contributions plan before the age of 591
2 is at a cost. Thus, such plans provide
a means of committing funds for retirement.
A desire to opt for this plan suggests a preference for delayed commitment since
subjects would rather not leave the allocation decision for the time prior to receiving
the increased salary. For concreteness, imagine that one expects to learn of a salary
increase in, say, December. The actual increase would take place in the following
month. In December, the allocation decision does not a⁄ect current consumption,
but rather next month￿ s budget set (menu), and a preference for avoiding making a
decision in December is consistent with a temptation to under-allocate next month￿ s
funds for retirement.19 The authors implemented the SMT plan in several ￿rms,
and ￿nd a signi￿cant demand for it. Across the implementations, the percentage of
employees that opted for the plan ranged between 27% (216 of 816) and 78% (162 of
207).20
19If this temptation did not exist at such a time, the SMT plan would be of no use to the agent:
he would make the optimal allocation decision at such a time anyway.
20One feature of the SMT plan that is problematic for our purposes is that the allocation decisions
32However, while Benartzi and Thaler￿ s results are suggestive of a demand for de-
layed commitment, they are not demonstrative. One can adjust the length of a period
in a way that the results could be explained by the CT model as well. For instance,
if a period is de￿ned to be two months long, then in December, January￿ s income is
part of the current period. In such a case, the allocation decision in December in-
volves current consumption, and the CT model can account for why agents prefer to
make an allocation decision prior to December. Thus, whether Benartzi and Thaler￿ s
results are taken as evidence of a demand for delayed commitment depends on the
stand one takes regarding the length of a period. Note that the earlier discussion
on the time of reversals is not sensitive to the de￿nition of a period ￿the CT model
cannot account for the evidence on the time of reversals.
We should add that, while the evidence on the time of reversals supports tempta-
tion by future consumption, it does not necessarily reject the CT model. Recall that
delaying rewards by about 3:5 years would induce a preference reversal for all the
subjects in Kirby and Hernnstein [13, Experiment 3]. Thus, if one de￿nes a period to
be over 3:5 years long, the subjects begin to look like CT agents: a one period delay
induces a preference reversal for all subjects. The upshot of this observation is that
the appropriate model to use in applications depends on the speci￿c application one
has in mind. In applications that study choices that are made frequently, it may be
natural to assume that a period is ￿ short￿ , and so the FT model may be more appro-
priate than the CT model. On the other hand, in applications that involve choices
made less frequently, the natural length of a period would be longer, and the longer
it is, the more appropriate it may be to use the CT model.
made by participants are not binding. Thus, SMT falls short of providing commitment. However,
the authors point out that only a small proportion of subjects drop out of the plan, and possible
reasons for this include inertia, procrastination, etc. If subjects are aware that such psychological
factors would stop them from dropping out of the plan in the future, then participating in the plan
does serve as a means of commitment.
337. Concluding Remarks
We summarize some basic di⁄erences between GP￿ s and our approach to providing
foundations for models of temptation.
￿ The starting point of GP￿ s approach is the idea that temptation creates
a preference for commitment, whereas our starting point is the idea that delayed
temptations are easier to resist than immediate temptations. Thus, GP look for a
re￿ ection of the con￿ ict between an agent￿ s normative and temptation preference
in his ranking of menus, whereas we look for a re￿ ection in his ranking of delayed
rewards.
￿ GP￿ s primitive is not just any ranking of menus, but rather one that cap-
tures the agent￿ s choices between menus in a special period 0 where no temptation
is experienced. This is a restrictive feature of GP￿ s approach; the observability of
the primitive ranking is not ensured, for instance, when modeling FT agents who
are tempted by menus that contain tempting items. In contrast, our primitive ￿a
ranking of delayed rewards ￿is one that captures choices that may well be subject to
temptation. Thus, its observability is not in question.
￿ Traditional revealed preference theory identi￿es choice and welfare. This
identi￿cation becomes invalid when studying decision-makers who have self-control
problems since temptation drives a wedge between choice and welfare. But GP hy-
pothesize that the identi￿cation may nevertheless be valid at the level of choice be-
tween menus. It is on the basis of this hypothesis that GP are able to provide
foundations for a model of temptation: an agent￿ s choices between menus can be
used to infer which alternatives he regards as best for his welfare and which he ￿nds
tempting. We argued in this paper that temptation can exist even at the level of
choices between menus, and thus, a reliance on the traditional identi￿cation of choice
and welfare may not be justi￿ed. In contrast with GP, our approach does not rely on
the identi￿cation at any level.
34A. Appendix: Topology on P
Since is ￿ is compact and metrizable, ￿￿￿ is compact and metrizable under the product topology.
Let d be a metric that generates the topology on ￿ ￿ ￿: Denote the space of nonempty compact
subsets of ￿ ￿ ￿ by P. For any A;B 2 P, let d(a;B) = infb2B d(a;b) and d(b;A) = infa2A d(b;a).
The Hausdor⁄ metric hd induced by d is de￿ned by
hd(A;B) = maxfsupd(a;B);supd(b;A)g;
for all A;B 2 P. An "-ball centered at A is de￿ned by
B(A;") = fB : hd(A;B) < "g:
The Hausdor⁄metric topology on P is the topology for which the collection of balls fB(A;")gA2P;"2(0;1)
is a base.
View the set P as the space of nonempty and continuous binary relations on ￿ by identifying
any such binary relation B on ￿ with ￿(B), the graph of B:
￿(B) = f(￿;￿) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿B￿g:
If B is a weak order (complete and transitive binary relation) then ￿(B) is nonempty. If B is also
continuous then ￿(B) is closed, and hence compact.21 Thus, the set of continuous weak orders on
￿ is a subset of P.
By [4, Thm 3.71(3)], compactness of ￿￿￿ implies that P is compact. Also, under compactness
of ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿(B) is the Hausdor⁄ metric limit of a sequence f￿(Bn)g ￿ P if and only if ￿(B) is the
￿ closed limit￿of f￿(Bn)g [4, Thm 3.79]. To de￿ne the closed limit of a sequence f￿(Bn)g, ￿rst de￿ne
the topological limit superior Ls￿(Bn) and topological limit inferior Li￿(Bn) of the sequence:
Ls￿(Bn) = fa 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ : for every neighborhood V of a;
V \ ￿(Bn) 6= ￿ for in￿nitely many ng
Li￿(Bn) = fa 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ : for every neighborhood V of a;
21The space of lotteries ￿ is connected, and moreover, it is separable since it is compact metric.
To show that ￿(B) is closed if B is a continuous weak order, use [7, Lemma 5.1 and Exercise 3.16 ].
35V \ ￿(Bn) 6= ￿ for all but a ￿nite number of ng:
The sequence f￿(Bn)g converges to a closed limit ￿(B) if ￿(B) = Ls￿(Bn) = Li￿(Bn).
B. Appendix: Normative Preference
This appendix collects some results from [19]. Take as given a set of preference relations f’tg1
t=0 on
￿, a set of lotteries de￿ned over any compact metric space and endowed with the weak convergence
topology. For each ￿;￿, the preference ’t captures how the agent ranks the rewards ￿;￿ when they




Consider the following axioms on f’tg.
Axiom A1 (Order￿) ’t is complete and transitive, for all t.
Axiom A2 (Continuity￿) The sets f￿ : ￿ ’t ￿g and f￿ : ￿ ’t ￿g are closed, for all t.
Axiom A3 (Reversal￿) If ￿ /0 ￿ and ￿ ’T ￿ with at least one ranking strict, then ￿ >t ￿ for all
t > T:
Axiom A4 (Independence￿) ￿ >t ￿ =) ￿￿￿ >t ￿￿￿; for all t:
De￿ne the function ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ! R which captures the time at which a reversal takes place for
each (￿;￿) in the following way: First take any (￿;￿) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ such that ￿ ’0 ￿: If
[￿ ￿ 0￿ =) ￿ ￿t ￿ for all t];
and [￿ > 0￿ =) ￿ >t ￿ for all t];
then de￿ne ￿(￿;￿) = 0, and if there exists T such that ￿ <T ￿, then de￿ne
￿(￿;￿) = minft : ￿ <t ￿g:
Finally, to cover all the remaining cases, let ￿(￿;￿) = ￿(￿;￿) for all ￿;￿: Note that by Reversal, if
￿ >0 ￿ and ￿ ￿t0 ￿ for some t0 then there exists T > t0 such that ￿ <T ￿ and also that Reversal
rules out post-reversal indi⁄erence.
36The following results were proved in [19] and will be used later.
Lemma B.1. Suppose f’tg1
t=0 satis￿es A1 and A3. Then, for any ￿;￿, if ￿(￿;￿) = 0 then,
￿ ’0 ￿ () ￿ ’t ￿; for all t ￿ 0;
and if ￿(￿;￿) > 0 then,
(a) ￿ >0 ￿ =) ￿ >t ￿ for all t < ￿(￿;￿) ￿ 1; ￿ ’t ￿ for t = ￿(￿;￿) ￿ 1; ￿ <t ￿ for all t ￿ ￿(￿;￿):
(b) ￿ ￿0 ￿ =) ￿ ￿t ￿ for all t < ￿(￿;￿); ￿ >t ￿ for all t ￿ ￿(￿;￿) or ￿ <t ￿ for all t ￿ ￿(￿;￿):
Lemma B.2. If f’tg satis￿es A1-3, then %￿ is well-de￿ned, complete, transitive and continuous.
Lemma B.3. If f’tg satis￿es A1-4, then %￿ also satis￿es independence.
The last Lemma provides two characterizations of normative preference %￿. Part (c) of the
Lemma is implied by (a). Let ￿ be the subset of ￿￿￿ on which ￿ is upper semicontinuous, that is,
￿ = f(￿;￿) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ : (￿n;￿n) ! (￿;￿) =) lim sup
n!1
￿(￿n;￿n) ￿ ￿(￿;￿)g:
Lemma B.4. (a) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ () [￿ >￿(￿;￿) ￿ and (￿;￿) 2 ￿]
(b) ￿ %￿ ￿ () 9 a sequence f(￿n;￿n)g that converges to (￿;￿) and ￿n ’￿(￿n;￿n) ￿n for all n:
(c) ￿ ’￿(￿;￿) ￿ =) ￿ %￿ ￿:
C. Appendix: Nondegeneracy
Let % be any binary relation that is represented by W : Z ! R such that
W(x) = max
￿2xfU(￿) + V (￿)g ￿ max
￿2x V (￿);
where U;V : ￿ ! R are linear and continuous. Say that (U;V ) is a representation of %, and that %
is nondegenerate if there exists x;y 2 Z such that
x ￿ x [ y ￿ y
The following Lemma will be useful throughout.
37Lemma C.1. For all x;y;
(a) x ￿ x [ y ()maxy V > maxx V and W(x) > W(y):
(b) x [ y ￿ y () maxx U + V > maxy U + V and W(x) > W(y):
(c) x ￿ x [ y ￿ y () maxx U + V > maxy U + V and maxy V > maxx V:
Proof. See [18].
Lemma C.2. Let (U;V ) be a representation of %, where U and V are as in (2.1). Then U and
V are nonconstant and U is not an a¢ ne transformation of V if and only if % is nondegenerate.
Proof. (=: Suppose there exists x;y such that x ￿ x[y ￿ y. By Lemma C.1(a), it is clear that V
is not constant. Neither can U be constant, for if U(￿) = k for all ￿, then a simple calculation shows
that W(z) = k for all z. Moreover, by Lemma C.1(c), U cannot be a positive a¢ ne transformation
of V . Suppose by way of contradiction that U is a negative a¢ ne transformation of V . Then,
U = ￿￿V + ￿ for some ￿ > 0, and so, by the functional forms of U and V ,
W(z) = ￿￿V (z) + ￿(c); (C.1)
where ￿(c) is some function of c. Observe that by de￿nition of V , for any z;w 2 Z,
V (z) ￿ V (w) =) V (z) = V (z [ w) ￿ V (w): (C.2)
But by hypothesis, there is x;y such that W(x) > W(x [ y) > W(y). It follows by (C.1) that
V (y) > V (x) and V (y) > V (x [ y) > V (x);
contradicting (C.2).
=): Suppose that U and V are nonconstant and that U is not an a¢ ne transformation of V .
Thus, U +V is nonconstant, and V is not a positive a¢ ne transformation of U +V . It follows that
there exist ￿;￿ such that either [V (￿) > V (￿) and U(￿) + V (￿) ￿ U(￿) + V (￿)], or [V (￿) ￿ V (￿)
and U(￿) + V (￿) < U(￿) + V (￿)]. If a case where all inequalities are strict obtains, then Lemma
C.1(c) implies
f￿g ￿ f￿;￿g ￿ f￿g;
thus yielding the result. If, however, we have V (￿) > V (￿) and U(￿) + V (￿) = U(￿) + V (￿), then
nonconstancy of U + V and linearity of V and U + V imply the existence of ￿0 and ￿0 close to ￿
and ￿, respectively, such that U(￿0) > U(￿0) and U(￿0) + V (￿0) > U(￿0) + V (￿0). Applying Lemma
C.1(c) yields the desired result. Similarly, the result follows in the case where V (￿) = V (￿) and
38U(￿) + V (￿) < U(￿) + V (￿) by using the nonconstancy of V , the linearity of V and U + V and
Lemma C.1(c).
The following corollary of the above Lemma will be used later.
Lemma C.3. If % is nondegenerate and has a representation (U;V ) where U and V are as in
(2.1), then there exist ￿;￿ 2 ￿ such that
f￿g ￿ f￿;￿g ￿ f￿g:
D. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1 (Necessity)
By hypothesis, there exists an FT preference % with a representation (U;V ) that generates the
choice correspondence C. De￿ne the function ￿ : ￿(C ￿ Z) ! R by ￿(￿) = U(￿) + V (￿) for all




Clearly, C(x) ￿ x: Since ￿ is continuous, the Maximum Theorem [4, Thm 16.31] yields that C
is nonempty, compact-valued (in particular closed-valued) and upper hemicontinuous. Hence ￿
generates a closed-valued choice correspondence C that satis￿es Axiom 2. That C satis￿es Axiom
1 can be checked easily. We need to show that C satis￿es Axioms 3-10. Proofs for Independence,
Separability and Indi⁄erence to Timing are omitted. Let ’ be the binary relation that is represented
by ￿. For all t ￿ 1, de￿ne ’t over Z by
x ’t y () x+t ’ y+t:
Lemma D.1. C satis￿es Set-Betweenness.
Proof. Note that
￿(x+t) = ￿




U(￿) + V (￿) ￿ max
￿2x
V (￿)) + ￿tV (x) + constant
= ￿
t(max




￿2x V (￿)) + constant.
Hence, ’t is represented by ￿
0(x) = max￿2x U(￿)+V (￿)￿(1￿
￿
t




￿t )V (￿) and U0(￿) = U(￿) +
￿
t








0 represents a Self-Control preference [10]. Therefore, C satis￿es the ￿rst part of Set-
Betweenness.
To establish the nondegeneracy part of Set-Betweenness, observe that by nondegeneracy of the
FT preference % and by Lemma C.3, there exists ￿;￿ such that f￿g ￿ f￿;￿g ￿ f￿g:We show
f￿g+1 > f￿;￿g+1 > f￿g+1. Recall that ’ is represented by ￿. By Lemma C.1, f￿g ￿ f￿;￿g ￿ f￿g
implies U(￿) > U(￿), ￿(￿) > ￿(￿) and V (￿) < V (￿). The latter implies V (f￿g) = V (f￿;￿g). Now
compute that V (￿) < V (￿) () (￿ ￿￿)V (￿) > (￿ ￿￿)V (￿) () ￿U(￿)+￿V (￿) > ￿(U(￿)+V (￿)￿
V (￿)) + ￿V (￿) () ￿W(f￿g) + ￿V (f￿g) > ￿W(f￿;￿g) + ￿V (f￿;￿g) () ￿(f￿g+1) > ￿(f￿;￿g+1):
Furthermore, f￿;￿g ￿ f￿g () ￿W(f￿;￿g) > ￿W(f￿g) () ￿W(f￿;￿g)+￿V (f￿;￿g) > ￿W(f￿g)+
￿V (f￿g) () ￿(f￿;￿g+1) > ￿(f￿g+1). Put together, ￿(f￿g+1) > ￿(f￿;￿g+1) > ￿(f￿g+1), as
desired.
Lemma D.2. C satis￿es Sophistication:










which can be re-written as
￿
0(x) = max
￿2x U0(￿) + V 0(￿) ￿ max
￿2x V 0(￿);
with U0 + V 0 = U + V . By Lemma C.1(b), for any ￿;￿;t such that {￿g >t f￿g;
f￿;￿g >t f￿g () U(￿) + V (￿) > U(￿) + V (￿):
But U + V represents ’ and thus f￿;￿g >t f￿g is equivalent to ￿ > ￿.
Lemma D.3. C satis￿es Menus Can Tempt.
Proof. Note that ’t is represented by W(￿)+
￿
t
￿t V (￿). By [18, Theorem 3.1], the FT preference %
satis￿es the following condition:
x ￿ x [ y () f(c;x)g ￿ f(c;x);(c;y)g;
and so W(x) > W(x [ y) () W(f(c;x)g) > W(f(c;x);(c;y)g):
40Suppose that x >t x [ y, that is, W(x) +
￿
t
￿t V (x) > W(x [ y) +
￿
t
￿t V (x [ y) for some t. Then,
V (x [ y) ￿ V (x) implies
W(x) > W(x [ y) , (D.1)
which, by Lemma C.1(a), implies
V (y) > V (x): (D.2)
By the earlier observation, (D.1) implies W(f(c;x)g) > W(f(c;x);(c;y)g. Furthermore, (D.2)
implies V (f(c;x);(c;y)g) > V (f(c;x)g) since V (f(c;x);(c;y)g) = v(c) + maxfx;yg V = V (c;y) >
V (c;x) = V (f(c;x)g). Since
￿










that is, f(c;x)g >t0 f(c;x);(c;y)g for some t0, as desired. The converse can be established in an
analogous manner. Note that V (f(c;x);(c;y)g) > V (f(c;x)g) implies V (y) > V (x), which in turn
implies V (x [ y) > V (x).
The next Lemma establishes that C satis￿es the second part of Reversal:
Lemma D.4. There exists ￿;￿ and T such that ￿ / ￿ and ￿+T > ￿+T:
Proof. By [18, Theorem 5.3], ￿ < ￿ implies that % exhibits preference reversals, in the sense of
[18, Section 5.1]. All we need to show is that there exists ￿;￿ such that
f￿g ￿ f￿;￿g ￿ f￿g.
The proof of this closely follows the su¢ ciency part of the proof of Lemma C.2. Since % is
nondegenerate, Lemma C.2 implies that U and V are nonconstant, and furthermore, U is not an
a¢ ne transformation of V . Thus, U+V is nonconstant and U is not a positive a¢ ne transformation of
U+V . It follows that there exist ￿;￿ such that either [U(￿) > U(￿) and U(￿)+V (￿) ￿ U(￿)+V (￿)],
or [U(￿) ￿ U(￿) and U(￿)+V (￿) < U(￿)+V (￿)]. Use Lemma E.3(a) and (b) and follow the proof
of Lemma C.2 to establish the result.
The proof of Lemma D.5 establishes that C satis￿es the ￿rst part of Reversal:Recall the time-
of-reversal function ￿ de￿ned in Appendix B.
41Lemma D.5. Suppose U(￿) ￿ U(￿). Then,
U(￿) ￿ U(￿)
V (￿) ￿ V (￿)









V (￿) ￿ V (￿)
62 (0;1] =) ￿(￿;￿) = 0:
Proof. By the representation, for t ￿ 0,
￿+t ’ ￿+t () U(￿) +
￿t
￿






V (￿)￿V (￿) 2 (0;1]. Since U(￿) ￿ U(￿), we have U(￿) > U(￿) and V (￿) < V (￿).
Furthermore,
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) ￿ 1 implies U(￿) + V (￿) ￿ U(￿) + V (￿). Since
￿
￿ < 1 and U(￿) > U(￿),
there exists ￿(￿;￿) such that
8t < ￿(￿;￿); U(￿) +
￿t
￿




8t ￿ ￿(￿;￿); U(￿) +
￿t
￿
t V (￿) > U(￿) +
￿t
￿
t V (￿): (D.3)
































If V (￿) = V (￿) or if V (￿) 6= V (￿) and
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) = 0, then it is straightforward to establish
that
￿ ’ ￿ () ￿+t ’ ￿+t;
and so ￿(￿;￿) = 0. Suppose V (￿) 6= V (￿) and
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) < 0. Then, V (￿) > V (￿). By hypothesis,
U(￿) ￿ U(￿), and so
￿
￿ < 1 implies ￿(￿;￿) = 0. Finally, suppose V (￿) 6= V (￿) and
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) > 1.
Then V (￿) < V (￿) and U(￿) + V (￿) > U(￿) + V (￿). Again it follows that ￿(￿;￿) = 0. Hence,
￿(￿;￿) = 0 if
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) 62 (0;1] and V (￿) 6= V (￿) or if V (￿) = V (￿): In particular, ￿(￿;￿) = 0 if
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) 62 (0;1].
Lemma D.6. If U(￿) > U(￿) then ￿ >t ￿ for all t ￿ ￿(￿;￿). In particular, U(￿) > U(￿) and
￿ > ￿ imply ￿(￿;￿) = 0.
42Proof. The ￿rst assertion is a corollary of Lemma D.5. The second assertion follows from the
￿rst.




Lemma D.7. If U(￿) 6= U(￿) then (￿;￿) 2 ￿:
Proof. Without loss of generality, U(￿) > U(￿). Take a sequence f(￿n;￿n)g that converges to
(￿;￿). Consider the following possibilities:




V (￿)￿V (￿) 62 (0;1]
We show the result for the case where
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) > 1; the other case follows by an analogous
argument. Note that U(￿) > U(￿) and
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) > 1 implies V (￿) < V (￿): By continuity of
V there exists M such that V (￿n) > V (￿n) for all n ￿ M. Without loss of generality, M = 1.
Note that
U(￿n)￿U(￿n)
V (￿n)￿V (￿n) !
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) > 1, and so there exists N such that
U(￿n)￿U(￿n)
V (￿n)￿V (￿n) > 1 for all
n ￿ N. Lemma D.5 implies ￿(￿n;￿n) = 0 for all n ￿ N. Hence limsupn!1 ￿(￿n;￿n) = 0 ￿ ￿(￿;￿),
implying (￿;￿) 2 ￿:
(ii)
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) 2 (0;1)
Then, there exists N such that for all n ￿ N,
U(￿n)￿U(￿n)
V (￿n)￿V (￿n) 2 (0;1). Without loss of generality,






￿ g for each n. Since
U(￿n)￿U(￿n)
V (￿n)￿V (￿n) !
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿), we have limn!1 ￿(￿n;￿n) = ￿(￿;￿), which establishes the result.
(iii)
U(￿)￿U(￿)
V (￿)￿V (￿) = 1
It must be that V (￿) < V (￿). Thus there exists M such that V (￿n) < V (￿n) for all n ￿ M.
Without loss of generality, M = 1. If there exists N such that
U(￿n)￿U(￿n)
V (￿n)￿V (￿n) > 1 for all n ￿ N,
then by Lemma D.5, ￿(￿n;￿n) = 0 ￿ ￿(￿;￿) for all n ￿ N and so (￿;￿) 2 ￿. If there is no
such N, then construct a subsequence f(￿n(m);￿n(m))g by deleting all (￿n;￿n) in f(￿n;￿n)g such
that
U(￿n)￿U(￿n)
V (￿n)￿V (￿n) 62 (0;1]. The subsequence f(￿n(m);￿n(m))g converges to (￿;￿) and for all m,
43U(￿n)￿U(￿n)
V (￿n)￿V (￿n) 2 (0;1). Note that ￿(￿n;￿n) = 0 for all these discarded (￿n;￿n), and that by the
argument in (ii), limsupn!1 ￿(￿n(m);￿n(m)) ￿ ￿(￿;￿). Thus limsupn!1 ￿(￿n;￿n) ￿ ￿(￿;￿), as
desired.
(b) V (￿) = V (￿):
Continuity of U and V implies limn!1(U(￿n) ￿ U(￿n)) > 0 and limn!1(V (￿n) ￿ V (￿n)) = 0:
Thus, there exists N such that for each n ￿ N;
U(￿n) ￿ U(￿n) > V (￿n) ￿ V (￿n);
Then, for each n ￿ N; either
U(￿n)￿U(￿n)
V (￿n)￿V (￿n) 62 (0;1] and V (￿n) 6= V (￿n), or V (￿n) = V (￿n). It follows
from Lemma D.5 that ￿(￿n;￿n) = 0 for all n ￿ N: Hence, limn!1 ￿(￿n;￿n) = 0.
The last lemma veri￿es that C satis￿es Commitment is Normative. Note that ￿(￿;￿) = 0 and
(￿;￿) 2 ￿ imply that ￿ is continuous at (￿;￿).
Lemma D.8. (a)x >t x [ y =) ￿(x+t;(x [ y)+t) = 0 and (x+t;(x [ y)+t) 2 ￿:
(b) x >t x [ y >t y =) ￿((x [ y)+t;y+t) = 0 and ((x [ y)+t;y+t) 2 ￿:




t V (x) > W(x [ y) +
￿t
￿
t V (x [ y):
From x ￿ x [ y it follows that V (x [ y) ￿ V (x). Hence the displayed inequality implies W(x) >
W(x[y), which in turn implies U(x+t) > U((x[y)+t). By Lemmas D.6 and D.7, ￿(x+t;(x[y)+t) = 0
and (x+t;(x [ y)+t) 2 ￿.
(b) Note that by Lemma E.3(a) below, W(x) > W(x [ y) implies
V (x [ y) = V (y) > V (x):
Hence, x [ y >t y implies
W(x [ y) +
￿t
￿




It follows that W(x [ y) > W(y), which implies U((x [ y)+t) > U(y+t). By Lemmas D.6 and D.7,
￿((x [ y)+t;y+t) = 0 and ((x [ y)+t;y+t) 2 ￿:
44E. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1 (Su¢ ciency)
The proof is divided into three sections. The ￿rst studies ’ and the second studies the normative
preference %￿ derived from ’. The third de￿nes a candidate preference % in terms of %￿ and veri￿es
that % is indeed an FT preference that generates C. Uniqueness is proved in Appendix F.
E.1. Properties of ’
De￿ne the choice correspondence C￿(￿;’) by
C￿(x;’) ￿ f￿ 2 x : ￿ ’ ￿ for all ￿ 2 xg:
Say that ’ rationalizes C(￿) if C(x) = C￿(x;’) for all x.
Lemma E.1. ’ is the unique preference relation that rationalizes C(￿). Furthermore ’ satis￿es
the vNM axioms.
Proof. Step 1: ’ is continuous.
We want to show that f￿ : ￿ ’ ￿g is closed for all ￿; that f￿ : ￿ ’ ￿g is closed for all ￿ follows by
an analogous argument. Take f￿ng such that ￿n ’ ￿ for all n and ￿n ! ￿. Consider the sequence of
menus ff￿n;￿gng. Since Z is endowed with the Hausdor⁄ metric, ￿n ! ￿ implies f￿n;￿g ! f￿;￿g.
By de￿nition of ’, ￿n 2 C(f￿n;￿g) for all n. By Continuity (upper hemicontinuity of C) and by [4,
Thm 16.20], ￿ 2 C(f￿;￿g), that is, ￿ ’ ￿, as desired. This establishes that f￿ : ￿ ’ ￿g is closed.
For the next steps, say that a binary relation is a weak order if it is complete and transitive and
de￿ne the revealed preference relation ’0 (with domain ￿) by
￿ ’0 ￿ () 9x such that ￿;￿ 2 x and ￿ 2 C(x):
Step 2: ’0=’ :
Suppose ￿ ’ ￿. Then, by de￿nition, there exists x (namely f￿;￿g) such that ￿;￿ 2 x and
￿ 2 C(x); so ￿ ’0 ￿. Hence, ￿ ’ ￿ =) ￿ ’0 ￿. Conversely, if ￿ ’0 ￿, then 9x such that ￿;￿ 2 x and
￿ 2 C(x). Nonemptiness of C and WARP imply ￿ 2 C(f￿;￿g). Hence ￿ ’0 ￿ =) ￿ ’ ￿.
Step 3: C￿(￿;’) is nonempty.
45The domain Z consists of compact menus, ’ is continuous (Step 1) and thus, C￿(￿;’) 6= ￿ by
[4, Thm 2.41].
Step 4: ’ is the unique weak order that rationalizes C(￿).
The result follows from Steps 2 and 3, and [16, Prop 1.D.2].
Step 5: ’ satis￿es the vNM axioms.
This follows from Steps 1 and 4, and by Independence.
For t > 0, de￿ne ’t over Z by
x ’t y () x+t ’ y+t:
We establish that each ’t satis￿es the following axioms.22
B1 (Order￿￿) ’t is complete and transitive.
B2 (Continuity￿￿) The sets fy : x ’t yg and fy : y ’t xg are closed.
B3 (Independence￿￿) x >t y =) ￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)z >t ￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)z:
B4 (Set-Betweenness￿￿) x ’t y =) x ’t x [ y ’t y.
B5 (Separability￿￿) If ￿1 = ￿1;￿2 = ￿2;￿1 = ￿1 and ￿2 = ￿2, then,
f￿;￿g tt f￿;￿g:
Let ￿s ￿ ￿ be the set of lotteries on C ￿ Z with ￿nite support and ￿s(Z) the set of lotteries







B6 (Indi⁄erence to Timing￿￿) For all ￿;￿;￿;￿ 2 ￿s, if ￿1 = ￿1;￿1 = ￿1;’(￿2) = ’(￿2) and
’(￿2) = ’(￿2), then,
f￿;￿g tt f￿;￿g:
Start by showing that ’t satis￿es Order￿, Continuity￿, Independence￿ and Set-Betweenness￿,
that is, ’t is a Self-Control preference [10].
22These axioms are discussed in [18].
46Lemma E.2. ’t satis￿es Order￿￿, Continuity￿￿, Independence￿￿ and Set-Betweenness￿￿.
Proof. It is clear that by Lemma E.1, ’t satis￿es Order￿￿ and Continuity￿￿. By Set-Betweenness,
’t satis￿es Set-Betweenness￿￿. To see that ’t satis￿es Independence￿￿, observe that by Indepen-
dence, for any x;y;z,
x+t > y+t =) ￿x+t + (1 ￿ ￿)z+t > ￿y+t + (1 ￿ ￿)z+t;
and that by Indi⁄erence to Timing,
￿x+t + (1 ￿ ￿)z+t t (￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)z)+t
￿y+t + (1 ￿ ￿)z+t t (￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)z)+t:
Independence￿￿ then follows by Order￿￿ and de￿nition of ’t.
By Lemma E.2 and [10, Theorem 1], each ’t is represented by Wt : Z ! R such that
Wt(x) = max
￿2x
fUt(￿) + Vt(￿)g ￿ max
￿2x
Vt(￿); (E.1)
where Ut;Vt : ￿ ! R are linear and continuous.
Lemma E.3. For all x;y;
(a) x >t x [ y ()maxy Vt > maxx Vt and Wt(x) > Wt(y):
(b) x [ y >t y () maxx Ut + Vt > maxy Ut + Vt and Wt(x) > Wt(y):
(c) x >t x [ y >t y () maxx Ut + Vt > maxy Ut + Vt and maxy Vt > maxx Vt:
Proof. This is Lemma C.1 adapted to the current setting.
Lemma E.4. ￿ ’ ￿ () Ut(￿) + Vt(￿) ￿ Ut(￿) + Vt(￿):
Proof. Fix any t > 0. By Commitment is Normative and the second part of Set-Betweenness, ’t
is nondegenerate and thus by Lemma C.3, there exists ￿;￿ such that
f￿g >t f￿;￿g >t f￿g:
By Order￿￿, f￿g >t f￿g and by Lemma E.3(b) and Sophistication, ￿ > ￿ and U(￿) + V (￿) >
U(￿) + V (￿). These observations will be used to prove the result.
47=): Suppose that ￿ ’ ￿. If f￿g >t f￿g, then by Sophistication, f￿;￿g 6>t f￿g and it follows
by Lemma E.3(b) that U(￿) + V (￿) ￿ U(￿) + V (￿). If, on the other hand, f￿g ’t f￿g, then by
Independence￿￿ and Independence,
f￿￿￿g >t f￿￿￿g and ￿￿￿ > ￿￿￿,
for all ￿ 2 (0;1). By Sophistication and Lemma E.3(b), U(￿￿￿) + V (￿￿￿) > U(￿￿￿) + V (￿￿￿) for
all ￿ 2 (0;1). By continuity of U + V , it follows that U(￿) + V (￿) ￿ U(￿) + V (￿), as desired.
(=: Suppose that U(￿)+V (￿) ￿ U(￿)+V (￿). If f￿g >t f￿g, then by Lemma E.3(b), f￿;￿g 6>t
f￿g and by Sophistication, ￿ ’ ￿. If, on the other hand, f￿g ’t f￿g, then for all ￿ 2 (0;1),
f￿￿￿g >t f￿￿￿g and U(￿￿￿) + V (￿￿￿) > U(￿￿￿) + V (￿￿￿):
By Lemma E.3(b) and Sophistication, ￿￿￿ > ￿￿￿ for all ￿ 2 (0;1). Thus, continuity of ’ implies
￿ ’ ￿.
Lemma E.5. ’t satis￿es Separability￿￿.




ut(c) + c Wt(y)
￿
d￿(c;y):
Take ￿;￿ such that ￿ = 1
2(c;x) + 1
















It follows that ’t satis￿es GP￿ s version of Separability, and so, by [11, Lemma 9(1)], U is additively
separable, thus establishing Step 1.
Step 2: Show that











vt(c) + b Vt(y)
￿
d￿(c;y):
Since V is linear and continuous, there exists a continuous function vt : C ￿ Z ! R such that






















































=) Vt(c;x) + Vt(c;x)) = Vt(c;x) + Vt(c;x))
=) vt(c;x) + vt(c;x) = vt(c;x) + vt(c;x)
=) vt(c;x) = vt(c;x) ￿ vt(c;x) + vt(c;x):





vt(c) + b Vt(y)
￿
d￿(c;y):




ut(c) + c Wt(y) + vt(c) + b Vt(y)
￿
d￿(c;y):
Step 3: Prove the result.
Take ￿;￿;￿ and ￿ such that ￿1 = ￿1;￿2 = ￿2;￿1 = ￿1 and ￿2 = ￿2. By Step 2,
Ut(￿) + Vt(￿) = Ut(￿) + Vt(￿) , Vt(￿) = Vt(￿),




fUt + Vtg = max
f￿;￿g





Hence by (E.1), f￿;￿g tt f￿;￿g:
Lemma E.6. ’t satis￿es Indi⁄erence to Timing￿￿:
Proof. The proof follows steps that are similar to those in Lemma E.5: for the c Wt and b Vt in
the proof of Lemma E.5, use Indi⁄erence to Timing to show that c Wt is linear, then show that b Vt is
linear, and then use (E.1) to establish the result.
E.2. Normative Preference %￿
For each t > 0, denote the restriction of ’t to ￿ ￿ Z by ’tj￿ , and de￿ne ’0j￿=’. Then f’tj￿g1
t=0
is a set of preference relations de￿ned over ￿. Since C(￿) satis￿es WARP, Continuity and Reversal,
f’tj￿g satis￿es the conditions in Lemma B.2. Thus, there is a well-de￿ned normative preference %￿
de￿ned over ￿ and a well-de￿ned function ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ! R as in Lemma B.1.
Lemma E.7. %￿ satis￿es order, continuity and independence
49Proof. Lemma B.2 establishes that %￿ is complete, transitive and continuous. To prove indepen-
dence, it su¢ ces by Lemma B.3 to show that each ’tj￿ satis￿es independence. Recall that ’tj￿ is
the restriction of ’t to ￿, and apply Lemma E.2.
In the remainder of the subsection we establish a stationarity property of %￿.
Lemma E.8. (c;￿) %￿ (c;￿) () (c0;￿) %￿ (c0;￿)
Proof. Step 1: (c;x)1
2(c0;x0) ￿￿ (c;x0)1
2(c0;x).
















2(c0;x)) = 0 and (c;x)1
2(c0;x0) t (c;x0)1




Step 2: The result.


























Lemma E.9. ￿+1￿￿+1 ￿￿ (￿￿￿)+1
Proof. By Indi⁄erence to Timing, ￿+1￿￿+1 t (￿￿￿)+1, and by Lemma E.6, for all t ￿ 1,
f￿+1￿￿+1g+t t f(￿￿￿)+1g+t. Hence, ￿(￿+1￿￿+1;(￿￿￿)+1) = 0 and ￿+1￿￿+1 t (￿￿￿)+1. Apply
Lemma B.4(c) to obtain ￿+1￿￿+1 ￿￿ (￿￿￿)+1.
Lemma E.10. ￿ %￿ ￿ =) (c;￿) %￿ (c;￿):
Proof. Step 1: ￿ ’￿(￿;￿) ￿ () ￿+1 ’￿(￿+1;￿+1) ￿+1:
First show that if ￿(￿;￿) > 0, then
￿(￿+1;￿+1) = ￿(￿;￿) ￿ 1: (E.3)
50For this purpose, suppose that ￿(￿;￿) > 0 and that, without loss of generality, ￿+t > ￿+t for all
t ￿ ￿(￿;￿) and ￿+t / ￿+t for all t < ￿(￿;￿). It follows that
￿+(t+1) > ￿+(t+1), for all t ￿ ￿(￿;￿) ￿ 1:
and ￿+(t+1) / ￿+(t+1), for all t < ￿(￿;￿) ￿ 1:
The assertion follows. Now prove the result. It follows by de￿nition of ￿ if ￿(￿;￿) = 0 (in which
case ￿(￿+1;￿+1) = 0 as well). When ￿(￿;￿) > 0, then note that ￿+￿(￿;￿) = (c;￿)+(￿(￿;￿)￿1) and
￿+￿(￿;￿) = (c;￿)+(￿(￿;￿)￿1). The result follows from (E.3).
Step 2: The result:
If ￿ %￿ ￿, then by Lemma B.4(b), there exists a sequence f(￿n;￿n)g such that (￿n;￿n) ! (￿;￿)
and ￿n ’￿(￿n;￿n) ￿n for all n. It follows by Step 1 that f(￿+1
n ;￿+1
n )g is a sequence such that
(￿+1
n ;￿+1






n for all n. But then by Lemma B.4(b), ￿+1 %￿ ￿+1:
The result follows by Lemma E.8.
Lemma E.11. ￿ %￿ ￿ () (c;￿) %￿ (c;￿):
Proof. By Lemma E.8, it su¢ ces to show ￿ %￿ ￿ () (c;￿) %￿ (c;￿). De￿ne a binary relation
%￿￿ over ￿ by ￿ %￿￿ ￿ () (c;￿) %￿ (c;￿). We need to show ￿ %￿ ￿0 () ￿ %￿￿ ￿0: This follows
from the three observations below:
(a) By Lemma E.10, ￿ %￿ ￿ =) ￿ %￿￿ ￿.
(b) The preference %￿￿ is non-trivial, that is, there exist ￿;￿ 2 ￿ such that ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿: By
the nondegeneracy condition in Set-Betweenness, there exists x;y such that x+t > (x [ y)+t. By
Commitment is Normative, we can assume that t > 1. Commitment is Normative also implies
￿(x+t;(x[y)+t) = 0 and ￿ is continuous at (x+t;(x[y)+t), and so (x+t;(x[y)+t) 2 ￿. By Lemma
B.4(a), x+t ￿￿ (x [ y)+t. It follows that x+(t￿1) ￿￿￿ (x [ y)+(t￿1), that is, %￿￿ is non-trivial.
(c) The preference %￿￿ satis￿es the vNM axioms: Follows from Lemmas E.7 and E.9:
E.3. FT Preference %
The candidate for the FT preference % over Z that generates C(￿) is de￿ned by
x % y () (c;x) %￿ (c;y);
51for some c 2 C. By Lemma E.8, the preference % is invariant to the choice of c. We verify that %
is an FT preference by checking that it satis￿es the conditions in [18, Theorems 3.1 and 5.3].
Lemma E.12. For any x;y,
(a) x >t x [ y for some t () x ￿ x [ y:
(b) x >t x [ y >t y for some t () x ￿ x [ y ￿ y:
(c) x >t x [ y tt y for some t =) x ￿ x [ y ￿ y:
Proof. Suppose x >t x [ y, or equivalently, x+t > (x [ y)+t . By Commitment is Normative,
￿(x+t;(x [ y)+t) = 0 and ￿ is continuous at (x+t;(x [ y)+t), and so (x+t;(x [ y)+t) 2 ￿. Hence,
by Lemma B.4(a), x+t ￿￿ (x [ y)+t, and repeated application of Lemma E.11 establishes x+1 ￿￿
(x[y)+1, which in turn establishes the su¢ ciency part of (a). For the converse, note that by Lemma
B.4(a), x+1 ￿￿ (x[y)+1 implies x >t x[y for t = ￿(x+1;(x[y)+1). A similar argument establishes
(b).
Turn to (c). In what follows we prove that x [ y tt0 y for all t0 ￿ t, since then (x [
y)+1 t￿((x[y)+1;y+1) y+1, and so by Lemma B.4(c), (x [ y)+1 ￿￿ y+1, that is, x [ y ￿ y.
As before, x >t x[y implies x >t0 x[y for all t0 ￿ t. It follows by Set-Betweenness that x >t0 y
for all t0 ￿ t. Then by Lemma E.3(b), for all t0 ￿ t;
x [ y tt0 y () max
￿2y
fUt0 + Vt0g ￿ max
￿2x
fUt0 + Vt0g: (E.4)
where Ut0 and Vt0 are as in (E.1). By Lemma E.4, for all t0 ￿ t;
max
￿2y
fUt0 + Vt0g ￿ max
￿2x
fUt0 + Vt0g () max
￿2y
fUt + Vtg ￿ max
￿2x
fUt + Vtg: (E.5)
By hypothesis, x [ y tt y. Thus, by (E.4) and (E.5), x [ y tt0 y for all t0 ￿ t, as desired.
In the remainder of the proof we verify that % is a nondegenerate FT preference and that it
generates C(￿). In Appendix E.1 we stated some axioms for the preference ’t. The same names will
be used for axioms that impose similar restrictions on %.
Lemma E.13. % satis￿es Order￿￿; Continuity￿￿. Moreover, % satis￿es Independence￿￿: for all
￿ 2 (0;1); f￿g ￿ f￿g =) f￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿g ￿ f￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿g:
52Proof. Follows from Lemmas E.7 and E.11, and de￿nition of %.
Lemma E.14. % satis￿es Stationarity￿￿: z % z0 () f(c;z)g % f(c;z0)g:
Proof. This follows from Lemmas E.11 and E.8, and by de￿nition of %.
Recall the set ￿ of points in ￿ ￿ ￿ on which ￿ is upper semicontinuous de￿ned by
￿ = f(￿;￿) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ : (￿n;￿n) ! (￿;￿) =) lim sup
n!1
￿(￿n;￿n) ￿ ￿(￿;￿)g:
Lemma E.15. % satis￿es Set-Betweenness￿￿: x % y =) x % x [ y % y:
Proof. Begin by establishing that if ￿ >￿(￿;￿) ￿ then
(￿+1;￿+1) 2 ￿ =) (￿;￿) 2 ￿: (E.6)
Suppose (￿;￿) 62 ￿, so that there exists a sequence f(￿n;￿n)g that converges to (￿;￿) and limsupn!1 ￿(￿n;￿n) >
￿(￿;￿). Without loss of generality, ￿(￿n;￿n) > ￿(￿;￿) for all n. Suppose by way of contradiction that
limsupn!1 ￿(￿n;￿n) = T < 1. Thus, there exists N such that for all n ￿ N, T + 1 > ￿(￿n;￿n).
Also, for large enough n, ￿n >￿(￿;￿) ￿n, and since
T + 1 > ￿(￿n;￿n) > ￿(￿;￿);
it follows that for all large enough n, ￿n ’T+1 ￿n. By continuity of ’T+1, ￿ ’T+1 ￿. But since
T +1 > ￿(￿;￿), this contradicts the hypothesis that ￿ >￿(￿;￿) ￿. Therefore, limsupn!1 ￿(￿n;￿n) =
1.
To complete the argument, observe that f(￿+1
n ;￿+1
n )g is a sequence that converges to (￿+1;￿+1),
and by (E.3), limsupn!1 ￿(￿+1
n ;￿+1
n ) = 1.23 It follows that (￿+1;￿+1) 62 ￿, thus proving (E.6).
To prove Set-Betweenness￿￿, we need to show
x+1 %￿ y+1 =) x+1 %￿ (x [ y)+1 %￿ y+1:
Denote ￿(x+1;y+1) by ￿ and consider two cases.
23Note that we had assumed ￿(￿n;￿n) > ￿(￿;￿) for all n, and so ￿(￿n;￿n) > 0 for all n, as
required by (E.3).
53Case (a): x+1 ￿￿ y+1
Then by Lemma B.4(a), x+1 >￿ y+1. By Set-Betweenness, x+1 ’t (x [ y)+1 ’t y+1 for all
t ￿ ￿. Hence
x+1 ’￿(x+1;(x[y)+1) (x [ y)+1 ’￿((x[y)+1;y+1) y+1;
and by Lemma B.4(c), x+1 %￿ (x [ y)+1 %￿ y+1:
Case (b): x+1 v￿ y+1
By Lemma E.11; x+￿ v￿ y+￿. Note that ￿(x+￿;y+￿) = 0. By Lemma B.4(a), either x+￿ t y+￿
or [x+￿ 6t y+￿ and (x+￿;y+￿) 62 ￿] holds.
(i) Suppose ￿rst that x+￿ t y+￿. Then by Set-Betweenness, x+￿ tt (x [ y)+￿ tt y+￿ for all t.
Thus, ￿(x+￿;(x [ y)+￿) = ￿((x [ y)+￿;y+￿) = 0 and x+￿ t (x [ y)+￿ t y+￿. By Lemma B.4(c),
x+￿ v￿ (x [ y)+￿ v￿ y+￿: By repeated application of Lemma E.11, x+1 v￿ (x [ y)+1 v￿ y+1; as
desired.
(ii) Now suppose [x+￿ 6t y+￿ and (x+￿;y+￿) 62 ￿] and without loss of generality, x+￿ > y+￿:
Since ￿(x+￿;y+￿) = 0, we have x+￿ >t y+￿ for all t. By Set-Betweenness, x+￿ ’t (x [ y)+￿ for all
t. If x+￿ >t (x [ y)+￿ for some t, then Commitment is Normative implies that ￿ is continuous at
(x+￿+t;y+￿+t), which implies (x+￿+t;y+￿+t) 2 ￿. By repeated application of (E.6), (x+￿;y+￿) 2 ￿,
a contradiction. Therefore, x+￿ tt (x [ y)+￿ for all t , and so, by an argument similar to the
one in (i), Lemma B.4(c) and repeated application of Lemma E.11 implies x+1 v￿ (x [ y)+1.
Furthermore, since by hypothesis, x+1 v￿ y+1; transitivity of %￿ implies (x [ y)+1 v￿ y+1. Put
together, x+1 v￿ (x [ y)+1 v￿ y+1; as desired.
Lemma E.16. % satis￿es Indi⁄erence to Timing￿￿: for any ￿;￿;￿;￿ 2 ￿s, if ￿1 = ￿1;￿1 =
￿1;’(￿2) = ’(￿2) and ’(￿2) = ’(￿2), then f￿;￿g v f￿;￿g:
Proof. Observe that by Lemma E.6, f￿;￿g tt f￿;￿g for all t ￿ 1. Thus, ￿(f￿;￿g+1;f￿;￿g+1) = 0
and f￿;￿g+1 t f￿;￿g+1. From Lemma B.4(c), we see that f￿;￿g+1 v￿ f￿;￿g+1, and so f￿;￿g v
f￿;￿g.
Lemma E.17. % satis￿es Temptation Stationarity￿￿:
x ￿ x [ y () f(c;x)g ￿ f(c;x);(c;y)g:
54Proof. By Lemma E.12(a) and Menus Can Tempt, x ￿ x [ y () x >t x [ y for some t ()
f(c;x)g >t0 f(c;x);(c;y)g for some t0 () f(c;x)g ￿ f(c;x);(c;y)g; as desired.
Lemma E.18. % is nondegenerate.
Proof. Use the nondegeneracy condition in Set-Betweenness and Lemma E.12(b).
The above Lemmas establish that % satisfy the conditions of [18, Thm 3.1], and so there exist
￿;￿ 2 (0;1), continuous functions u;v : C ! R and continuous linear functions U;V : ￿(C￿Z) ! R
and W;V : Z ! R such that for all x 2 Z,
W(x) = max
￿2x











v(c) + ￿V (y)
￿
d￿(c;y); where V (x) = max
￿2x
V (￿)
and furthermore, W represents %. It remains to show that ￿ < ￿ and that % generates C(￿).
Lemma E.19. % generates C(￿).
Proof. By nondegeneracy of %, U is not an a¢ ne transformation of V (Lemma C.2). Lemmas
E.12(a) and E.12(b) establish that for all t, % has more preference for commitment than ’t and %
has more self-control than ’t; see GP for de￿nitions of these terms. By [10, Theorem 8], for each t,
Ut = ￿U + (1 ￿ ￿)V and Vt = ￿0U + (1 ￿ ￿0)V;
for ￿;￿0 2 [0;1], which implies
Ut + Vt = (￿ + ￿0)U + (2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0)V: (E.7)
Furthermore, by [10, Theorem 9],
Ut + Vt = ￿(U + V ) + (1 ￿ ￿)V = ￿U + V; (E.8)
for ￿ 2 [0;1]. Together, (E.7) and (E.8) imply (￿ + ￿0)U + (2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0)V = ￿U + V: Since U is not
an a¢ ne transformation of V , conclude that Ut + Vt = U + V: Hence, by Lemma E.4,
￿ ’ ￿ () U(￿) + V (￿) ￿ U(￿) + V (￿):
55By Lemma E.1, ’ rationalizes C(￿). Therefore the above displayed equivalence implies that for all
x 2 Z,
C(x) = argmax
￿2xfU(￿) + V (￿)g;
as desired.
Lemma E.20. ￿ < ￿:
Proof. By Set-Betweenness, there is x;y and t such that x ￿ y and x+t > y+t. Thus,
x+t > y+t





iu(c) + ￿iv(c) + ￿




iu(c) + ￿iv(c) + ￿








Since V (y) ￿ V (x) (recall that x ￿ y) and
￿
t
￿t > 0, conclude that W(x) > W(y), and hence by
Lemma E.3(a) that V (y) > V (x). Suppose by way of contradiction that
￿
t
￿t > 1. Then the preceding
implies y+T ’ x+T for a large enough T > t, that is, ￿(x+t;y+t) > 0. But, by Commitment is




Suppose by way of contradiction that
￿
t
￿t = 1. Then, for all ￿;￿ and t > 0,
￿+t ’ ￿+t








() W(￿) + V (￿) ￿ W(￿) + V (￿)
() U(￿) + V (￿) ￿ U(￿) + V (￿)
() ￿ ￿ ￿:
That is, ￿(￿;￿) = 0 for all ￿;￿. This contradicts the latter part of Reversal. Hence,
￿
t
￿t < 1, and
the assertion follows.
F. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1 (Uniqueness)
Lemma F.1. If U(￿) = U(￿) and ￿ > ￿, then (￿;￿) 62 ￿:
56Proof. By the de￿nition of ’, U(￿) = U(￿) and ￿ < ￿ imply V (￿) < V (￿). By nondegeneracy,
there exists ￿;￿ such that U(￿) > U(￿) and V (￿) < V (￿). Consider the sequence f(￿￿n￿;￿￿n￿)g
that converges to (￿;￿). Since U;V are linear, for each n, U(￿￿n￿) > U(￿￿n￿) and V (￿￿n￿) <
V (￿￿n￿) and by Lemma D.6,
￿￿n￿ >t ￿￿n￿ for all t ￿ ￿(￿￿n￿;￿￿n￿): (F.1)
The hypothesis (U(￿) = U(￿) and ￿ < ￿) implies that for all t;
￿ <t ￿: (F.2)
Suppose by way of contradiction that limsupn!1 ￿(￿￿n￿;￿￿n￿) = T ￿ ￿(￿;￿): Then there exists
N such that
￿(￿￿n￿;￿￿n￿) < T + 1; for all n ￿ N. (F.3)
However, ￿ <T+1 ￿ by (F.1) and so there exists N0 such that
￿￿n￿ <T+1 ￿￿n￿; for all n ￿ N0.
But by (F.1) this implies ￿(￿￿n￿;￿￿n￿) > T + 1 for all n ￿ maxfN;N0g, contradicting (F.3).
Lemma F.2. If x ￿ y, then there exists T such that (c;x) >t (c;y) for all t ￿ T:
Proof. The hypothesis implies U(c;x) > U(c;y), and the result follows from Lemma D.6.
Lemma F.3. If x ￿ y, then ￿(x+1;y+1) = 0.
Proof. Since, for any t;
(c;x) ’t (c;y) () W(x) +
￿t+1
￿




the hypothesis x ￿ y implies (c;x) ’t (c;y) () V (x) ￿ V (y). It follows that for all t;t0; (c;x) ’t
(c;y) () (c;x) ’t0 (c;y), that is, ￿(x+1;y+1) = 0.
Lemma F.4. C(￿) is generated by a unique FT preference %.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that % and %0 are two FT preferences that generate C(￿)
and that there exist x and y such that x ￿ y and y %0 x. Let (U;V ) and (U0;V 0) be representations of
% and %0, respectively. If x ￿ y and y ￿0 x; then by Lemma F.2, % and %0 do not generate the same
choice correspondence, a contradiction. So suppose that x ￿ y and y ￿0 x: By the representation,
57x ￿ y implies f(c;x)g ￿ f(c;y)g, and so, U(c;x) > U(c;y). By Lemma D.7, (x+1;y+1) 2 ￿. We
show that (x+1;y+1) 62 ￿ also holds, thereby establishing the desired contradiction. By Lemma
F.3, y ￿0 x implies ￿(x+1;y+1) = 0: Then Lemma F.2 and x ￿ y imply (c;x) > (c;y). However,
y ￿0 x and (c;x) > (c;y) imply U0(c;x) = U0(c;y) and V 0(c;x) > V 0(c;y), and so, by Lemma F.1,
(x+1;y+1) 62 ￿.
G. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4.2
First prove the Theorem for a representation (U;V ) of a nondegenerate FT preference % for which
V ￿ 0. Let ’ be the preference relation that is represented by ’ : ￿(C ￿ Z) ! R where for all
￿ 2 ￿;
’(￿) = U(￿) + V (￿):
For each t > 0, de￿ne ’t on ￿ by
￿ ’t ￿ () ￿+t ’ ￿+t:
It is straightforward to establish that ’t is represented by ’t : ￿(C ￿ Z) ! R where for all ￿ 2 ￿;





Lemma G.1. The sequence f’tg uniformly converges to U.
Proof. The sequence f’tg is a sequence of continuous real functions de￿ned on a compact space
￿. Since V ￿ 0 and
￿
￿ < 1, the sequence is monotone decreasing and ’t converges pointwise to the
continuous function U. Therefore, by Dini￿ s Theorem [4, Theorem 2.62], the convergence is uniform.
Since % is nondegenerate, there is x;y such that x ￿ y. By the representation, U(c;x) > U(c;y).
Thus, there exists ￿;￿ 2 ￿ such that U(￿) > U(￿). By linearity of U,
U(￿) ￿ U(￿) =) U(￿￿￿) > U(￿￿￿), for all ￿ 2 (0;1): (G.1)
This observation will be used in the next Lemma. Let %U be the preference relation represented by
U. As in Appendix A, identify any binary relation B on ￿ with its graph ￿(B) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.
58Lemma G.2. ￿(%U) = limt!1 ￿(’t):
Proof. First establish Ls￿(’t) ￿ ￿(%U). If (￿;￿) 2 Ls￿(’t) then there is a subsequence
f￿(’t(n))g and a sequence f(￿n;￿n)g that converges to (￿;￿) such that (￿n;￿n) 2 ￿(’t(n)) for each
n. Therefore, for each n,
’t(n)(￿n) ￿ ’t(n)(￿n):
Since ’t(n) converges to U uniformly, it follows that U(￿) ￿ U(￿). Hence (￿;￿) 2 ￿(%U), as desired.
Next establish ￿(%U) ￿ Li￿(’t). Let (￿;￿) 2 ￿(%U) and take any neighborhood V of (￿;￿).
By (G.1), there exists ￿ 2 (0;1] s.t (￿￿￿;￿￿￿) 2 V and U(￿￿￿) > U(￿￿￿). By Lemma G.1, there
exists T < 1 such that ’t(￿￿￿) > ’t(￿￿￿) for all t ￿ T, that is, (￿￿￿;￿￿￿) 2 ￿(’t) for all t ￿ T.
Hence,
V \ ￿(’t) 6= ￿ for all but a ￿nite number of t;
that is, (￿;￿) 2 Li￿(’t). This completes the proof.
By Lemma G.2, %U=%￿, that is, U is a representation of normative preference %￿, as desired.
This proves the Theorem for a representation (U;V ) for which V ￿ 0. To complete the proof,
let (U;V ) be any representation of %. Given nondegeneracy of %, [10, Theorem 4] implies that for
any ￿ such that V + ￿ ￿ 0, (U;V + ￿) is also a representation of %. Hence, it follows from the
preceding that U is a representation of normative preference %￿.
H. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5.1
Necessity of each axiom is either trivial or as in Appendix D. We prove su¢ ciency. De￿ne {’t} over
Z as in Appendix E.1 and note that by Preferences Reverse Tomorrow, ’t=’t0 for all t;t0 > 0. Let
%0=’1, and take %0 is the candidate CT preference. It is readily veri￿ed that %0 is nondegenerate
and satis￿es the axioms Order￿￿, Independence￿￿, Continuity￿￿, Set-Betweenness￿￿, Separability￿￿
and Indi⁄erence to Timing￿￿ stated in Appendix E.1. Preferences Reverse Tomorrow implies that
%0 satis￿es Stationarity￿￿, and by Lemmas E.1 and E.4, Sophistication implies that %0 generates
C(￿).













v(c) + b V (y)
￿
d￿(c;y);
59where b V is linear and continuous. See the proof of [18, Theorem 3.1]. We proceed to show that b V
is cardinally equivalent to W.
Lemma H.1. f(c;x)g %0 f(c;y)g =) f(c;x)g ￿0 f(c;x);(c;y)g
Proof. Follows from Menus Do Not Tempt.
Lemma H.2. There exists ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ such that for all x;
b V (x) = ￿W0(x) + ￿:
Proof. If b V is constant (equal to some ￿), then the result follows with ￿ = 0. Therefore suppose
that b V is nonconstant. Suppose by way of contradiction that b V is not ordinally equivalent to W0.
That is, there exists x and y such that
b V (x) ￿ b V (y) and W0(x) < W0(y),
or b V (x) > b V (y) and W0(x) ￿ W0(y):
We show that in either case, nonconstancy of b V and W0 implies the existence of menus for which
both inequalities are strict. We prove this for the case that b V (x) = b V (y) and W0(x) < W0(y). The
same argument can be applied to the other case, that is, b V (x) > b V (y) and W0(x) = W0(y). So
suppose b V (x) = b V (y) and W0(x) < W0(y). There are two possibilities to consider. First, there
is z such that b V (x) > b V (z).24 If W0(x) < W0(z), there is nothing to prove. If W0(z) ￿ W0(x),
then W0(z) < W0(y), and since b V (y) > b V (z), the assertion is proved for this case as well. Second,
there is z such that b V (z) > b V (x). The argument is similar. Since b V is nonconstant, one of the two
possibilities must be true, and hence we are done.
Therefore we can assume without loss of generality that
W0(x) > W0(y) and b V (x) < b V (y):
Observe that
W0f(c;x)g = u(c) + ￿W0(x) > u(c) + ￿W0(y) = W0f(c;y)g:
If ￿W0(x) + b V (x) > ￿W0(y) + b V (y), then
W0f(c;x)g = u(c) + ￿W0(x) > u(c) + ￿W0(x) + b V (x) ￿ b V (y) = W0(f(c;x);(c;y)g):
24A b V ￿best and worst menu exists since b V is continuous and Z is compact.
60This contradicts Lemma H.1. On the other hand, if ￿W0(x) + b V (x) ￿ ￿W0(y) + b V (y), then
W0f(c;x)g = u(c) + ￿W0(x) > u(c) + ￿W0(y) = W0f((c;x);(c;y)g;
again contradicting Lemma H.1. Thus we establish that b V is ordinally equivalent to W0. Since b V
and W0 are also linear, it follows that they must be cardinally equivalent. Thus, there exists ￿ ￿ 0
and ￿ such that for all x;
b V (x) = ￿W0(x) + ￿;
as was to be shown.












It remains to show that %0 is the unique CT preference that generates C(￿). Note that for any
c;x;y;
(c;x) 2 C(f(c;x);(c;y)g)
() u(c) + ￿W0(x) + v(c) + ￿W0(x) ￿ u(c) + ￿W0(y) + v(c) + ￿W0(y)
() W0(x) ￿ W0(y)
() x %0 y:
Therefore, if two CT preferences generate the same choice correspondence, then they must
coincide.
I. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5.2
The argument used in the proof of Theorem 4.2 goes through. The only modi￿cation is that each
’t de￿ned there is now represented by ’￿
t : ￿(C ￿ Z) ! R where for all ￿ 2 ￿; ’￿
t(￿) = U(￿):
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